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DOLLY PLUMB, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
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Priority No. 16

Defendants.
MALCOLM A. MISURACA; HALEY &
STOLEBARGER; DOUGLAS B.
PROVENCHER; and BEYERS, COSTIN
& CASE,
Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTION
The Memorandum Decision appealed from was entered October 31,
1989. A Determination of Finality certifying the decision as final
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) was entered on January 2, 1990.
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on January 2, 1990.

This

Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j)
(Supp. 1989).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the law of the case doctrine prohibit the trial

court from modifying its Orders entered on December 5 and 6, 1988,
where the Orders were entered after a hearing of which all parties
had been given proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, all
necessary relevant evidence had been presented to the court, and

the court had been fully briefed concerning the relevant legal
issues, and where no new evidence was presented to the court
justifying the modification of the prior orders, but where the only
claimed justification for modification of the prior orders was the
court's reevaluation of the legal arguments which had been previously presented to the court?
This is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court for
correctness. See State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1989).
2.

Was the trial court's award of a total attorney fee of

$4.25 million supported by the evidence where the only competent
evidence established that the minimum reasonable award was 5.8
million?
Whether the award amount was reasonable is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.

If there was no evidentiary support, the

reduction is reviewed for correctness.

See Dixie State Bank v.

Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988); Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v.
Reichert,

3.

784 P.2d 1210, 1215-16 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Did the trial court err in awarding a fee based in part

on the number of hours spent by class counsel ("lodestar analysis")
rather than awarding a percentage of the amount recovered?
This presents a question of law to be reviewed by this Court
for correctness.

See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985

(Utah 1988).
4.

Is weight of the evidence contrary to the trial court's

finding that class counsel's court performance does not merit
exceptional recognition?

2

The standard of review is whether the finding is contrary to
the great weight of the evidence. See Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989).
5.

Did the trial court err in basing its finding concern-

ing class counsel's court performance on events which occurred
subsequent to the work for which attorney fees were awarded?
The standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Bambrough
v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976).
6.

Must the decision be remanded where the trial court did

not make findings on all material issues sufficient to determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion?

See Regional Sales

Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215-16 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) .

7.

Does a trial court have discretion to appoint a special

master to review cost disbursements in class action litigation,
where there is no complex accounting to be performed and the only
justification for the appointment is the trial court's lack of time
to adequately review the matter?
The issue of whether the trial court has discretion is a
question of law, to be reviewed by this Court for correctness. See
Swainston v. Intermountain Health Caref Inc., 766 P.2d 1059 (Utah
1988)

(trial court ruled on discretionary matter based on an

erroneous legal premise; reviewed for correctness); Dixie State
Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988).

3

8.

Is a trial court's appointment of a special master

fatally defective where the court did not enter any findings of
fact which would support the conclusion that there existed extraordinary circumstances justifying the appointment of the special
master?
This is a question of law subject to review by this Court for
correctness.
9.

If the appointment of a special master was within the

discretion of the trial court, did the trial court abuse its
discretion in appointing a special master under the circumstances
of this case?
The scope of review for this issue is whether the trial court
abused its discretion.

See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th

Cir. 1982).
10.

Where the order appointing a special master instructed

the special master to review cost disbursements and fee requests
to service providers, did the special master exceed the scope of
his appointment by undertaking to review the reasonableness of the
attorney fees previously awarded by the court?
This is a question of law subject to review by this Court for
correctness.
11.

Where a special master has apparently exceeded the

scope of his initial charge and parties in interest have filed
objections to the proceedings of the special master and have
requested oral argument on those objections and related motions,
did the trial court abuse its discretion in summarily denying the
4

motions without receiving oral arguments and in sua sponte modifying the order of appointment?
The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its
discretion.
12.

See Billincrs v. Brown. 639 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1981).
Does the trial court have authority to appoint a

special master to review the law and to make a recommendation to
the court concerning legal issues relative to the award of attorney
fees to class counsel in class action litigation?
This is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court for
correctness.

See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, rehfg

denied, 352 U.S. 1019 (1957).
13.

If the appointment of a special master to make recom-

mendations to the court on legal issues is within the court's
discretion, did the trial court abuse its discretion in making such
an appointment under the circumstances of this case?
This issue is subject to review for abuse of discretion.
14.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

class counsel's motion to strike the reports of the special master
and to quash the appointment of the special master, where the
uncontroverted evidenced showed that the master has exceeded the
scope of his charge, had perceived his role as that of an advocate
for the class, had undertaken to take evidence through ex parte
contacts with various persons and without holding a hearing or
making any record, and in otherwise failing to act as an unbiased
judicial officer?

5

The issue of whether the master's actions were appropriate
is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court for correctness.
The issue of whether the trial court should have stricken the
master's report and quashed the master's appointment should be
reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion.

See Focrel v.

Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100 (2nd Cir. 1981).
15.

Is reversal of the judgment required by reason of the

trial court's improper delegation of much of the judicial function
to the special master, the trial court's frequent ex parte conferences with the special master regarding judicial orders, and
the trial court's apparent ex parte contacts with the special
master regarding the special master's knowledge gained through the
special master's own ex parte investigation?
This issue presents a question of law to be reviewed by this
Court for correctness.
16.

Were the recommendations of the special master sup-

ported by the evidence?
This issue should be reviewed by this Court on a clearly
erroneous standard.

See Rohde v. K. 0. Steel Castings, Inc., 649

F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1981).
17.

Did the trial court err in giving any weight to the

report of the special master where that report did not contain any
findings or recommendation concerning the factual issues before the
court?
The issue of whether the special master was required to make
factual findings is a question of law subject to review by this

6

Court for correctness. The issue of whether the trial court erred
in failing to strike the report should be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.
18.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to

grant counsel's timely request for postponement of the hearing
scheduled for July 17, 1989, where counsel for class counsel was
unable to attend the majority of the hearing and was accordingly
unable to effectively present his arguments at the hearing?
This issue should be reviewed by this Court for an abuse of
discretion.
19.

See Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1875 (Utah 1988).
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in quashing

the subpoenas issued at the request of class counsel for the
purpose of presenting testimony at the July 17, 1989 hearing?
This issue should be reviewed by this Court for an abuse of
discretion.

See Bullock v. Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah

1975).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The provisions of Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are set forth in the Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from an award

of attorney fees to the attorneys for the plaintiff class in class
action tort litigation.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

underlying class action was filed on July 20, 1987.
7

The

Enabling

legislation to effect a settlement was enacted by the Utah State
Legislature on October 4, 1988, and signed into law by Governor
Norman Bangerter on October 11, 1988, effective upon the passage
of sixty days.

The legislation, together with subsequent amend-

ments, is codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-21-1 to -10 (Supp. 1989) .
After notice to all parties in a form approved by the trial court,
a hearing on the settlement and on class counsel's request for an
award of attorney fees was held on November 30, 1988.

Evidence

regarding fees was accepted both by testimony and affidavit.
On December 5, 1988, the trial court issued a Memorandum
Decision, and on December 6, 1988, an Order, which, among other
things, approved the settlement, awarded class counsel attorney
fees of 5.8 million, and appointed a special master, James U.
Jensen, "for the purpose of reviewing requests for cost reimbursements . . .," retaining those cost reimbursement requests made by
expert witnesses, lobbyists and other under advisement. The course
of proceedings after the appointment of the master is set forth in
more detail in the Agreed Statement in Lieu of Record on Appeal
(included in the Appendix) and in the Argument. The special master
ultimately submitted a final report and recommendation on July 14,
1989.
On July 17, 1989, the trial court held a hearing to consider
the report of the special master and entertain arguments of counsel.

Following the hearing, the court entered

a Memorandum

Decision on October 31, 1989, which purported to alternatively
withdraw all prior orders relating to attorney fees or to amend
8

them as having been interim orders, and made a reduced attorney fee
award to class counsel of 4,25 million dollars.
On November 21, 1989, class counsel filed a Motion to vacate
the Memorandum Decision, and simultaneously and in conjunction with
the plaintiff depositor class, filed a Motion to disqualify Judge
David S. Young based on statements made in the Memorandum Decision
and on prior statements.

The motion was denied by Judge Scott

Daniels at a hearing on December 27, 1989. A formal Order denying
the motion was entered January 16, 1990.

Appellants subsequently

withdrew the Motion to Vacate as being moot.
On December 1, 1989, appellants filed a Motion for a Determination of Finality pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) . The motion
was granted by Order entered January 2, 1990.

Appellants filed

their Notice of Appeal the same day.
C.

Statement of Facts. The facts relevant to this action

are set forth in the Agreed Statement in Lieu of Record on Appeal
(herein

"Agreed

Statement")

which

appears

in

the

Appendix.

Additional facts are set forth in connection with the Argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The law of the case doctrine promotes confidence in the
stability of judicial decisions, encourages judges to make a
correct decision in the first instance and prohibits judges from
sitting in review of their own decisions. The trial court in this
case violated that doctrine.

The court entered an award of attor-

ney fees following a hearing of which all parties had been given
notice and at which all interested parties had an opportunity to
9

object and present evidence and arguments, and at which arguments
both for and against the claimed award of attorney fees were made
by competent counsel.

The trial court committed error in there-

after reviewing and modifying its own decision.

Such a modifica-

tion can appropriately be made only where there has been a change
of circumstances or where other exceptional circumstances exist
which justify reconsideration of the decision.

The mere citation

of additional case authority is not justification for reconsideration.

Similarly improper as a grounds for reconsideration is the

trial court taking the time to make a more thorough review of
materials which were already available to the court prior to the
first decision.

No valid justification existed in this case for

the trial court to reexamine its own decision, and the trial court
committed error in so doing.
Even if the trial court possessed the legal authority to
reconsider its own decision, there was no evidentiary basis to
modify the decision.

All of the admissible evidence in the case

established that the initial award of attorney fees was reasonable,
or was less than reasonable.

The plaintiff class, from whose

recovery the attorney fee would be deducted, had agreed to the fee
initially awarded.

The trial court reduced the fee based predom-

inantly on "lodestar" analysis and on impressions and feelings
concerning appellants which were developed subsequent to the time
for which the attorney fees were to be awarded.

Lodestar analysis

should be rejected by this Court in common fund cases in favor of
a percentage

fee approach.

A growing number of courts have
10

rejected lodestar and adopted a percentage fee approach after
extensive investigation. The lodestar analysis promotes dissention
between the attorneys and their clients, and involves a detailed
accounting which is unnecessary and unproductive. The trial court
further committed error in basing the reduction in attorney fees
on events which transpired subsequent to the period for which fees
were awarded. Such evidence of subsequent events is irrelevant and
should not have been considered by the trial court.
The trial court further committed error in referring issues
concerning the reasonableness of attorney fees to a special master.
There were no exceptional circumstances which justified the appointment of a master to review the attorney fees. More critically , both the master and the trial court apparently viewed the
master's role to be that of an advocate cloaked with quasi-judicial
authority.

The master improperly took evidence on the issue of

attorney fees off the record and without notice to the interested
parties. The master communicated the improperly obtained evidence
to the trial court through both formal reports and ex parte contacts.

The proceedings before the special master were violative

of due process, and the trial court erred in failing to strike the
reports and appointment of the master.
Finally, the extent of the trial courtfs involvement in the
improper proceedings of the master have put the trial court in the
position of having received extensive evidence and arguments in a
procedurally improper context.

Any remand of this case should be
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to a different judge who has not been tainted by the receipt of the
improperly obtained evidence.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS BARRED BY THE LAW OF
THE CASE FROM RECONSIDERING ITS INITIAL
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES.
The complicated and embroiled procedural history of this case
demonstrates the evil of permitting a judge to recall and reconsider apparently

final orders.

The trial court's Memorandum

Decision of December 5, 1988, and the Order of December 5, 1988,
appeared on their face to make a conclusive and final award of
attorney fees.

The trial court imperiled the certainty of all

judicial decisions by improperly purporting to recall and reconsider its own decision.
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that a decision, once
made, should be considered final except in very unusual circumstances.

In Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P. 2d 662

(1966), the Court considered whether a party should be permitted
to seek reconsideration, and "re-re-consideration," etc., of a
ruling on a motion for new trial. The Court held that a motion for
reconsideration was not permitted under the rules, and also explained that the restriction applied both to litigants and to the
trial court:
This reflection brings one to realize what
an unsatisfactory situation would exist if
a judge could carry in his mind indefin12

itely a state of uncertainty as to what the
final resolution of the matter should be.
When the precedure [sic]
authorizing a motion for a new trial has
been followed and, pursuant to proper
notice, the parties have made their representations to the court, and the court has
duly considered and made his decision upon
that motion, that completes both the duty
and the prerogative of the court. In order
to avoid such a state of indecision for
both the judge and the parties, practical
expediency demands that there be some
finality to the actions of the court; and
he should not be in the position of having
the further duty of acting as a court of
review upon his own ruling.
Drury, 415 P.2d at 663-64 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Although Drury dealt with a final ruling, the same logic
applies to reconsideration of interim rulings.

The "law of the

case" doctrine provides that a decision will not be reconsidered
at the same level except in very limited circumstances; any review
should be by an appellate court:
Although M[a]ny judge is free to
change his or her mind on the outcome of
a case until a decision is formally rendered," Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P. 2d 757,
760 (Utah 1985) , the "law of the case"
doctrine is employed to avoid delay and to
prevent injustice. "The purpose of [this]
doctrine is that in the interest of economy
of time and efficiency of procedure, it is
desirable to avoid the delays and the
difficulties
involved
in
repetitious
contentions and rulings upon the same
propositions in the same case." Richardson
v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397
(Utah 1977). See Condor v. A.L. Williams
& Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987) . "Although a trial court
is not inexorably bound by its own precedents, prior relevant rulings made in the
same case are generally to be followed."
13

People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court,
666 P.2d 550, 553 (Colo. 1983).
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 45
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The law of the case is sometimes expressed in terms of
prohibiting a different judge of the same court from overruling a
prior decision in the case.

E.g., Sittner v. Bier Horn Tar Sands

& Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984).

The doctrine is

equally applicable, however, to prohibit reconsideration of a
ruling by the same judge or court which made the initial ruling.
State ex rel. C.Y. v

Yates, 765 P.2d 251, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

(appellate court woaid not reconsider its own prior ruling); Salt
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44-45
(Utah App. 1988) (trial court properly refused to reconsider his
own prior ruling, even though the ruling was wrong on the merits
and subsequently reversed by appellate court).
The cases acknowledge that there are circumstances in which
a court might properly reconsider its own ruling, but such circumstances do not exist in this case.

The trial court apparently

believed that justification existed for reexamining its ruling
because it discovered additional cases on attorney fees and because
it had taken the opportunity to review in more detail the materials
which had been previously submitted.

These factors do not con-

stitute grounds for reconsidering a decision. This was illustrated
in the case of Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d
735 (Utah 1984) .

The trial court in that case had denied the
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plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and another judge of the
same court later granted the motion.

The Utah Supreme Court

reversed and remanded for trial, without considering whether the
summary judgment was proper and thus whether there were any fact
issues to be tried.

The Court stated as follows:

No discovery took place between the
two hearings on the summary judgment
motions.
No additional evidence was
introduced. All material facts remained
the same.
Indeed, a comparison of the
moving papers filed in support of the
original motion and the renewed motion
discloses that the only difference between
the two was the citation of additional
authorities.
Sittner, 692 P.2d at 736.
No procedural or other irregularities have been claimed with
respect to the November 30, 1988, hearing concerning attorney fees.
All parties were given notice in a form approved by the trial
judge.

(Agreed Statement para. 9.) All parties had an opportunity

to present arguments. Arguments by capable counsel were presented
both for and against appellants' claim for attorney fees.

(Agreed

Statement para. 13.) No restrictions were placed on the time which
the trial court had to study the record before making a decision,
nor on the scope of cases or other materials which the trial court
could review.

After having taken what the court then apparently

considered to be a sufficient time to advise itself, the court
entered a Memorandum Decision which, among other things, found the
following:
(1) That the attorneys have reasonably spent in excess of 12,000 hours, and
will spend more time before the matter is
15

concluded. The novelty and difficulty of
the issues involved has required tremendous
skill in dealing with these problems before
the legislature and before the court,
(2) It is obvious that acceptance
of this employment precluded other opportunities for employment.
(3) The fees customarily charged for
employment such as this involve contingent
arrangements.
This litigation could not
reasonably have otherwise been entertained,
and the amount of 20% to 40% of the
recovery is appropriate in this and other
similar communities.
(4) Considering the amounts involved
and the results obtained, it is difficult
for the Court to find that counsel could
have expected a much more optimistic
result, though tha depositors individually
did.
It is easily arguable that the
maximum amount of liability under any
scenario that the State should have
incurred would have been an amount equal
to the guarnteed [sic] amount of $15,000.00
per account which was the ILGC guarantee
on such accounts.
Thus, anyone whose
account exceeded $15,000.00 could arguably
have never expected a greater recovery.
(5) The time limitations imposed by
the clients appear to be fundamentally
irrelevant, except as they may apply to
item (2) above.
(6)
The nature and length of the
relationship does not raise issues that are
remarkable, except to state that perhaps
the fact that the matter has been resolved
in less than two years and without the
necessity of trial would argue for a
reduction in fees.
(7) The experience, reputation and
ability of the lawyers is obvious and has
been exemplary.
(8) The contingent relationship has
already been referred to.

16

Having considered each of the foregoing, the Court finds that a fee at the
minimum of the contingent agreement relationship in the amount of 20% of the total
recovery is reasonable.
The attorney's
fees are thus awarded in the amount of
$5,800,000.00. However, the Court finds
that many matters related to this case have
not been concluded by counsel and thus the
Court will reserve 10% of the fee until
counsel have faithfully completed all
matters in the case.
Memorandum Decision, filed December 5, 1988, at pp. 6-7.

(A

complete copy of the Memorandum Decision appears in the Appendix.)
Based on the foregoing findings, the trial court entered an
Order

awarding

the attorney

fees to

appellants,

ordering that 90% of the fees "are to be paid

and

further

immediately."

(Order, filed December 6, 1988, p. 3, para. 3. A copy of the Order
appears in the Appendix.)

Nothing in the Order indicated that it

was other than a final determination of the attorney fee issue.
Based upon the well-established doctrine of the law of the
case, the trial court erred in reconsidering its December 5, 1988
Memorandum Decision and December 6, 1988 Order.

This case should

be remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate the
December 6, 1988 Order.
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POINT II
REDUCTION OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS BASED IN
PART ON THE LODESTAR ANALYSIS, WHICH IS
NOT APPROPRIATE FOR COMMON FUND CASES, AND
WAS CONTRARY TO THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
A.

The

Lack

Of

Detailed

Findings

Of

Fact

Precludes

Meaningful Appellate Review And Requires Reversal,
The amount of fees awarded to attorneys for successful
plaintiffs in class action litigation is determined by the court.
"Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion
of the trial court, and will not be overturned in the absence of
a showing of a clear abuse of discretion."

Dixie State Bank v.

Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted).

The

award of attorney fees must, however, be supported by evidence in
the record.

Id.

Where a party has made a prima facia showing of

an entitlement to a specified amount of fees, it is error for the
court to reduce the fees without making an adequate explanation
for the reduction.

Id.; Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517-18

(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

The court's analysis and evidentiary

foundation for reducing the fees must be set forth in findings of
fact with enough detail to enable the reviewing court to determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion.

Regional Sales

Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215-16 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) .
The trial court in this case was required to make specific
findings to justify the reduction of the claimed fee. The court's
initial award was supported by the evidence.
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The court itself so

held in its Memorandum Decision of December 5, 1988. In addition,
appellants proffered to the trial court evidence from several
expert witnesses (attorneys skilled in class action and percentage
fee litigation) each of whom established that the initial fee award
was reasonable or less than reasonable.
submitted in support of the reduction.

No contrary evidence was
The agreement between

appellants and the plaintiff class provided that a reasonable fee
would be in the range of 20-40% of the recovery. The fee initially
awarded by the court was 20% of the $29 million portion of the
recovery.
The trial court was accordingly required to explain its
reasons for reducing the fee.
the Memorandum
reduced.

It is impossible to determine from

Decision, however,

precisely why

the

fee was

The Memorandum Decision does recite the various factors

which may be considered by the court in fixing a fee, but does not
detail how the court analyzed each factor. To the extent that the
court does explain its analysis, the analysis does not support the
fee ultimately awarded.
Appellants argue in Point I of this brief that the law of the
case requires that the trial court reinstate its initial award of
attorney fees.

If this Court does not so hold, the case must

nonetheless be remanded to the trial court for the entry of
specific findings to enable this Court to review whether the trial
court abused its discretion.
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B.

This Court Should Adopt A Percentage-Of-Fund Approach

To Setting Attorney Fees In Common Fund Litigation.
Much of the dispute before the trial court and the special
master centered around the attempt to apply "lodestar" or hourbased analysis to this case.

Although award of attorney fees is

usually reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988), no deference need be given
where the trial court's discretion was exercised based on an
erroneous legal standard.

See Swainston v. Intermountain Health

Care, Inc., 766 P. 2d 1059

(Utah 1988)

(trial court ruled on

discretionary matter based on an erroneous legal premise; reviewed
for correctness); see also Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 11617 (2nd Cir. 1981).
The appellants and the trial court assumed, without citation
to any supporting authority, that the trial court had ultimate
discretion to set the fee. The Special Master cited as support for
this proposition the case of Damac, Inc. v. Whitler, 118 111. App.
3d 560, 455 N.E. 2d 254 (1983), where the court stated:
In a class action, the fee is not the
result of a voluntary agreement between the
attorney and his client. Rather, the fee
is an amount taken by order of the court
from money that belongs to others, and the
amount is dependent upon the exercise of
the court's sound discretion.
455 N.E.2d at 256 (citations omitted).
In the instant case, however, the fee agreement was the
result of a voluntary agreement between the attorneys and their
clients.

Over 80% of the class expressly approved the fee agree20

ment.

Over 99.9% of the class approved the settlement, together

with appellants' request for a fee of $7.25 million.

Although the

fee agreement did state that the fees would be set by the trial
court, the fee agreement also clearly stated that a reasonable fee
would be awarded, and that a reasonable fee would be (1) based on
a percentage of the recovery and (2) in the range of 20% to 40% of
the recovery.

Under the unique circumstances

of this case,

therefore, the trial court was required to give great deference to
the "contractual" agreement between the class and their counsel,
and to set the fee as a percentage of the recovery, with 20% - 40%
being the agreed range of a reasonable fee.
It appears from the record that the trial court instead
choose to largely ignore the agreement, and computed a fee based
on an analysis of the hours spent by appellants. The trial court's
reduction in fees was largely influenced by lodestar analysis.
"Lodestar" is a term which was coined by the court in Lindy
Brothers, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator and Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
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(3rd Cir. 1973).

The lodestar

approach essentially has the court determine the number of hours
reasonably spent in obtaining the results, and then adjust the
compensation for those hours either up or down by a multiplier the
court determines appropriate.

Factors considered in the adjust-

ments include the quality of the work performed and the contingent
nature of the case, etc.

Other modifications of the lodestar

approach have been developed;

for example, the Fifth Circuit
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adopted a fifteen-factor method to calculate fees.

Johnson v.

Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
Such hour-based formulas have come under increasing attack,
and the better reasoned opinions now recognize that the preferred
approach in common fund cases is to award a fee based on a percentage of the recovery.

The United States Supreme Court recog-

nized this method as being common in Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
900 n. 16 (1984) . The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, which was the court to initially adopt the lodestar
approach, has now rejected that approach in favor of a percentage
fee approach.

Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court

Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985).
A recent court to adopt the common fund approach analyzed the
logic of prior cases as follows:
Courts have pursued a number of
alternatives at the fee application stage.
Some, by themselves or with the assistance
of a magistrate, have waded through the
computer printouts, which often represent
years of work by several firms, their
partners, associates, and paralegals.
Others have appointed special masters
familiar with the field and with attorney
billing to perform the details of the task
and to make a recommendation. The special
master is then paid from the common fund.
This court has used both of these alternatives. Undoubtedly, there are more creative ones that other courts have found.
What is curious is that whatever method is
used and no matter what billing records are
submitted to the Lindy or Kerr-Johnson
[Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526
F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975), cert, denied sub
nom.. Perkins v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc. ,
425 U.S. 951 (1976) ; and Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., supra] regimen, the
result is an award that almost always
22

hovers around 30% of the fund created by
the settlement.
The question this court is compelled
to ask is, "Is this process necessary?"
Under a cost-benefit analysis, the answer
would be a resounding, "No!" Not only do
the Lindy and Kerr-Johnson analysis consume
an undue amount of court time with little
resulting advantage to anyone, but, in
fact, it may be to the detriment of the
class members. They are forced to wait
until the court has done a thorough,
conscientious analysis of the attorneys'
fee petition. Or, class members may suffer
a further diminution of their fund when a
special master is retained and paid from
the fund. Most important, however, is the
effect the process has on the litigation
and the timing of settlement.
Where
attorneys must depend on a lodestar
approach there is little incentive to
arrive at an early settlement. The history
of these cases demonstrates this as noted
below in the discussion of typical percentage awards.
In re Activision Securities Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1376
(N.D. Calif. 1989) .
The court analyzed cases from numerous other jurisdictions
and concluded as follows:
Reviewing this history the court is
compelled to conclude that the accepted
practice of applying the lodestar or KerrJohnson regimen to common fund cases does
not achieve the stated purposes of proportionality, predictability and protection
of the class, it encourages abuses such as
unjustified work and protracting the
litigation. It adds to the work load of
already overworked district courts.
In
short, it does not encourage efficiency,
but rather, it adds inefficiency to the
process.
Therefore, this court concludes that
in class action common fund cases the
better practice is to set a percentage fee
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and that, absent extraordinary circumstances that suggest reasons to lower or
increase the percentage, the rate should
be set at 3 0%. This will encourage plaintiff's attorneys to move for early settlement, provide predictability for the
attorneys and the class members, and reduce
the time consumed by counsel and court in
dealing with voluminous fee petitions.
Id. at 1378-79.

See also McConaughy, Back to the Future:

Use of

Percentage Fee Arrangements in Common Fund Litigation, 12 U. Puget
Sound L. Rev. 43 (1988) (recommends the use of a percentage fee
agreement in common fund cases, and notes that a fee of 20 to 25%
is typical.)
It is evident from a review of the record in this case that
both the special master and the trial court were overly concerned
with trying to relate the number of hours spent by appellants to
the fee awarded, and with the claimed disparity between the value
of those hours at an hourly billing rate and the amount of the
claimed fee.

The disparity does not, however, mean that the

claimed compensation is unreasonable.

As set forth in the cases

cited above, appellants could no doubt have protracted the litigation with the result that their hours would have been higher.
Appellants should not be penalized for their efficiency:
Where success is a condition precedent to
compensation, "hours of time expended" is
a nebulous, highly variable standard, of
limited significance. One thousand plodding hours may be far less productive than
one imaginative, brilliant hour. A surgeon
who skillfully performs an appendectomy in
seven minutes is entitled to no smaller fee
than one who takes an hour; many of
patients would think he is entitled to
more.
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Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: "The Salvage Factor" in Counsel Fee
Awards. 60 Harvard L. Rev. 658, 660 (1956).
This Court should hold that the number of hours spent should
be given little, if any, weight in determining the appropriate
attorney fee in common fund litigation, and that the attorney fee
should generally be determined as a percentage of the recovery.
It was error in this case for the trial court to give any weight
to the number of hours spent, and the reduction of attorney fees
must be vacated.
C.

There Is No Evidentiary Basis For The Trial Court's

Conclusion That Appellants' Hours Were Padded Or Unreasonable.
The preceding analysis establishes that the number of hours
spent by counsel should not be a factor in determining an attorney
fee award.

Even if this Court affirms the trial court's reliance

on lodestar analysis, the multiplier chosen by the trial court is
not supported by the evidence.
Awards of attorney fees are addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988
(Utah 1988).

Where the underlying evidence is proffered, however,

this Court is in as good a position as the trial court to evaluate
the evidence.

Bess v. Jensen, 782 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct. App.

1989) (citing Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great N. Baseball
Co., 748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987)).

Under such circumstances,

the trial court's decision should be affirmed only if this Court
is convinced of its correctness.

Id.

See also Rohde v. K. 0.

Steel Castings. Inc., 649 F.2d 317, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1981).
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On page 10 of its Memorandum Decision, the trial court
"suggests that class counsel's reported hours submitted to the
court were higher than reasonable hours, and the court has noted
certain

discrepancies

in such

reported

master's final report made similar claims.

hours."

The

special

(Final Report, p. 20.)

Nowhere, however, does either the court or the special master
detail exactly what discrepancies exist, nor give any factual basis
for the claim that the hours were higher than reasonable hours.
The court's unsupported statements should be stricken and the
reduction in fee vacated.
D.

The Trial Court Improperly Based the Fee Reduction on

Events Which Occurred After the Fee Was Earned.
In connection with its original fee award, the trial court
found that "[t]he experience, reputation and ability of the lawyers
is obvious and has been exemplary."

(Memorandum Decision, filed

December 5, 1988, at p. 7.) As supposed support for the reduction,
the trial court found on October 31, 1989, that "on the issue of
evaluation of skills and competence of counsel, the Court finds
based in part on the hearing of July 17, 1989, and a review of the
record, that counsel's court performance does not merit exceptional
recognition."

(Memorandum Decision, filed October 31, 1989, p.

10.)
Even assuming that something occurred in the July 17, 1989,
hearing which would justify the trial court in criticizing the
court performance of appellants, that hearing occurred long after
the period of time for which fees were sought.
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Subsequent events

are generally not admissible proof concerning what happened on a
prior event.

See Utah R. Evid. 407.

There was no evidence which could support the trial court
changing its finding. The original finding was based solely on the
trial courtfs observation of appellants in various court proceedings prior to December 5, 1988.
issue was presented.

No additional evidence on that

It was error for the trial court to re-

consider the finding.
Of more concern is that fact that the trial court apparently
changed its finding because of a personal dislike for one of the
appellants and a personal offense at arguments presented at the
July 17, 1989, hearing.

Although the trial court states in its

Memorandum Decision that it had reviewed "the oral arguments of
counsel" from the July 17 hearing (Memorandum Decision, Oct 31,
1989, p. 1), the trial court really only reviewed the arguments of
Malcolm A. Misuraca.
Adamson, attorney

Arguments were also presented by Craig G.

for the depositors, and by Jackson Howard,

attorney for appellants. The arguments of Mr. Misuraca were really
only intended to fill time while the parties waited for Mr. Howard
to appear at the arguments.

The primary arguments for appellants

were offered by Mr. Howard.
Yet

the trial

court

ordered

Misuracafs arguments at the hearing.

a transcript

of

only Mr.

The arguments presented by

Mr. Misuraca were critical of the trial court, and the trial court
apparently took umbrage.

A review of the October 31, 1989,

Memorandum Decision compels the conclusion that it is primarily a
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personal response to the arguments of Mr. Misuraca.

It was wholly

improper for the trial court to have stooped to penalizing the
appellants by a personal attack on Mr. Misuraca.
POINT III
THE IMPROPER PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE MASTER
REQUIRE REVERSAL.
Rule 43(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly
states that "[i]n all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be
taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these
rules, the Utah Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this state."
(Emphasis added.)

Our judicial

system

contemplates that all

evidence considered by the judge will be developed in the courtroom.

In limited circumstances, a judge is permitted to view the

premises in question in a lawsuit, but only when notice is given
to all parties.

E.g.. Hiahbaraer v. Thornock. 94 Idaho 829, 498

P.2d 1302, 1304 (1972).

It is reversible error for a judge to

violate this fundamental notion of due process by investigating the
facts himself.

Id.

Equally "fundamentally contrary to the nature of our adversary system" would be a judge acting as an advocate for one of the
parties.

Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah 1982).

A trial court clearly cannot employ another judicial officer
to improperly take evidence which the judge could not do himself.
Yet such a fundamental violation of due process occurred in this
case.

The trial court appointed a special master for the stated

purpose of reviewing requests for cost reimbursement.
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The initial

appointment appeared of record and was limited in scope.

There

thereafter commenced, however, a series of discussions between the
master and court, all off the record, in which the master apparently persuaded the court to increase the master's authority and
pursuant to which the master undertook to provide an advocacy role
in the litigation.

Although the trial court in its Memorandum

Decision purported to conduct "its own review and evaluation," and
to make "its own memorandum decision," (Memorandum Decision at 78), the proceedings had become so tainted by the contact with the
master that appellants were denied a right to a fair trial before
an unbiased judge.

The error was prejudicial and requires rever-

sal. The primary areas of error relating to the master are briefed
below.
A.

The Activities Of The Special Master Exceeded Both The

Scope Of His Appointment And The Permissible Duties Of A Special
Master.
Special Master James U. Jensen1 was initially appointed
solely for the limited purpose of reviewing the claims for cost
reimbursement submitted to the trial court.
object to the initial appointment.

When

Appellants did not
it became evident,

however, that the special master was vastly exceeding the scope of
his employment, appellants did object (Motion to Strike Reports of

Another special master, Arthur Anderson, was appointed to
review certain accounting matters and to make disbursements of funds
to class members. The appointment and scope of the activities of
Special Master Arthur Anderson are not at issue in this appeal. The
term "special master" as used herein, unless otherwise indicated,
shall refer only to James U. Jensen.
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Special Master and for Other Relief, filed June 15, 1989), but the
trial court overruled the objections and attempted to expand the
scope of the master's inquiry beyond all permissible bounds.

The

matter should be reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion.
The abuse of discretion is patent.
Rule 53(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in
part, as follows:
The order of reference to the master may
specify or limit his powers and may direct
him to report only upon particular issues
or to do or perform particular acts or to
receive and report evidence only and may
fix the time and place for beginning and
closing of the hearings and for the filing
of the master's report.
Subiect to the
specifications and limitations stated in
the order, the master has and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings
in every hearing before him and to do all
acts and take all measures necessary or
proper for the efficient performance of his
duties under the order.
(Emphasis added.)
Because the use of special masters is a rare occurrence, the
Utah courts have developed almost no case law interpreting Rule 53.
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is essentially the same as the Utah Rule, has generated more, though not
extensive, case law.

Where the Utah case law is not fully devel-

oped, and because the Utah Rules are patterned after the Federal
Rules, federal law may be used as a guide.

Heritage Bank & Trust

v. Landon, 770 P.2d 1009, 1010 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Accord

Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 n.l (Utah 1984).
Subsection (c) of Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
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is identical to the same provision of the Utah rule in every
respect except that the words "the master11 are used in the federal
rule where the Utah rule uses the word "he."
The plain language of Subsection (c) dictates that when a
special master is appointed to perform only certain tasks delineated in the order of reference, then the powers of the master are
limited

in scope to those specifically enumerated

items.

In

explaining the federal rule, Moore's Federal Practice states as
follows:
The scope of the master's authority "may"
be specified or limited by the order of
reference. If so, the order of reference
is "at once the chart and limitation of the
master' s authority. " And the master should
not exceed it even with the consent of the
parties. The order of reference may direct
the master to report only upon particular
issues or to do or perform particular acts
or to receive and report evidence only.
But as indicated by the use of the word
"may" in the first sentence and by the
general grant of power given by the second
sentence of subdivision (c), a reference
containing no limitations is a general
reference to report on all the issues, both
of law and fact, involved in the litigation.
5A J. Moore, W. Taggert and J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice.
para. 53.06 (2d ed. 1989) (quoting Ferguson Contracting Co. v.
Manhattan Trust Co. . 118 F. 791, 794 (6th Cir. 1902)) (emphasis
added).

(Hereinafter "Moore's".)

Moore's goes on to state as follows:
The order of reference is the chart of the
master's authority, which may give the
master broad, general powers, or may
specify or limit his powers, direct him to
report only upon particular issues, do or

31

perform particular acts, or to receive and
report evidence only. The report of the
master should accordingly be responsive to
the order of reference.
5A Moore's, at para. 53.10[1] (citations omitted).
master may not exceed the scope of his charge because

A special
fl

[t]he power

of a special master is completely dependent upon the order of
reference." United States v. I.B.M. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). Accord Messier v. Messier, 140 Vt. 308, 438 A.2d 397 (1981)
(interpreting rule of civil procedure identical to Utah's).
The trial court first mentions the appointment of James U.
Jensen as Special Master in its Memorandum Decision dated December
5, 1988. On pages 8 to 9 of that decision, this Court specifically
held as follows:
3.
The unpaid costs and fees proportion
shall be reserved, subject to a similar
accounting to the Court directly. Since
these matters will require voluminous
supportive documentation, the Court hereby
and herein appoints James U. Jensen, Esq. ,
under Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure as a Special Master for the
purpose of reviewing the specific documentation giving rise to the requested reimbursement costs. Mr. Jensen is to make
specific recommendations to the Court as
to his findings. No fees will be approved
for reimbursement of costs or unpaid costs
and expenses until specifically recommended
by the master and approved by the Court.
Mr. Jensen is charged with a duty both to
be fair to those requesting payment and to
function as a fiduciary for the purpose of
preserving the maximum estate to the
depositor group from the funds so withheld.
Mr. Jensen and/or persons in his firm are
hereby expressly authorized to have access
to any and all documentation supporting
such costs and fees, including the lobbyist's fee requests, and shall be provided
such material upon request at the offices
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of D.0.I.T., Arthur Andersen, Research
Associates and/or any other firm, entity
or individual requesting compensation as
they deem necessary. Compensation to Mr.
Jensen shall be carefully reviewed by the
Court and shall be paid from the funds
reserved.
Memorandum Decision, pages 8-9 (emphasis added).2
The order of reference, which according to Rule 53 is the
controlling document, provides as follows:
4.
That James U. Jensen, Esq. be
appointed, pursuant to Rule 53 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, as a special
master for the purpose of reviewing
requests for costs reimbursements, and that
services rendered as special master be
compensated from the funds hereinafter
reserved, as approved by the court;
Order of December 6, 1988, page 3 (emphasis added).
The trial court's direction and charge to the Special Master
was clear.

James U. Jensen was appointed for the purpose of

reviewing costs reimbursements only. The Special Master, however,
took it upon himself to go beyond the scope of his charge and

The language of the Memorandum Decision in several places
mentions "fees." It is readily apparent, however, that the fees
referred to are those of the experts and not attorney's fees.
Immediately preceding the above quoted paragraph, the Memorandum
Decision states that "[t]he reimbursement for depositors in the
amount of $300,000.00 shall be reserved, subject to release on
specific application to the Court based upon specific documentation
of costs and fees and shall only be released upon Court approval."
(Emphasis added.) Paragraph 3 then begins by speaking to the same
unpaid costs and fees, which clearly refers to the $300,000.00 in
costs previously advanced by the DOIT Committee, for which reimbursement was sought. Likewise, the other references in paragraph 3 to
"fees" refer to expert fees, including the specifically referenced
"lobbyist's fee requests", and not to attorney's fees. There should
have been no confusion on the part of the Special Master as to the
meaning of these terms.
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review the issue of attorney fees notwithstanding the fact that
that issue had already been determined by the trial court.
When appellants objected to the appointment of the master,
the trial court responded by sua sponte entering a series of minute
entries which purported to "clarify" the masterfs responsibilities.
The minute entries, copies of which appear

in the Appendix,

essentially set the master up as an advocate for the class with a
duty to challenge the prior orders of the court.

Aside from the

procedural irregularities in attempting to expand the scope of the
charge after the fact, the court had no authority to vest a special
master with the roles of both advocate and judge.3
Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as
follows:
(a)
Appointment and Compensation. Any
or all of the issues in an action may be
referred by the Court to a master upon the
written consent of the parties, or the
court may appoint a master in an action,
in accordance with the provisions of
Subdivision (b) of this rule.
* * *

(b)
Reference. A reference to a master
shall be the exception and not the rule.
In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are
complicated; in actions to be tried without
a jury, save in matters of account, a
3

Even more disturbing is the fact, revealed for the first time
in billing records filed with the court subsequent to the filing of
the Notice of Appeal herein, that the special master conferred
extensively with the Court in response to the challenges to the
special master's appointment, and presumably participated in ruling
on the objections to his own appointment. (E.g., Affidavit of Robert
L. Stolebarger in Support of Motion for Disqualification, filed Nov.
21, 1989, at paras. 25-26.)
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reference shall, in the absence of the
written consent of the parties, be made
only upon a showing that some exceptional
condition requires it.
(Emphasis added.)

This requirement that the appointment of a

special master must be "the exception and not the rule" is derived
from important policy considerations: first, "the function of the
master [is] to hear only those matters which it would unduly hamper
the court (or the jury) to deal with;" second, Rule 43(a) requires
"all testimony of witnesses to be taken orally in open court,"
unless otherwise provided by the rules; and third, the exceptional
conditions requirement of Rule 53 "is an obvious corollary of the
policy against the judiciary abrogating its functions." 5A Moore's
at para. 53.05[1].
The United States Supreme Court established the standard for
determining "exceptional conditions" in the case of La Buy v. Howes
Leather Co. , 352 U.S. 249, reh'cr. denied, 352 U.S. 1019 (1957).
The Court held that "[t]he use of masters is 'to aid judges in the
performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the
progress of a cause,' and not to displace the Court."
(quoting In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920)).

Id. at 256
In light of

this fact, the Court went on to establish a standard of very
limited use of special masters. Neither congested court calendars,
unusual complexity of issues of fact and law, nor the possibility
of a very lengthy trial are exceptional conditions.

Id. at 259.

The Court held that detailed accounting required to determine
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damages might be referred to a master provided the circumstances
indicate that the use of the Court's time is not warranted.

Id.

Calendar congestion, complex issues, and the possibility of
lengthy trials had, previous to La Buy, been cited frequently as
exceptional conditions.

The Supreme Courtfs elimination of these

concepts for exceptional conditions "has led La Buy to be widely
interpreted as sharply limiting the use of non-consensual reference."

Liptak v. United States, 748 F.2d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir.

1984) (citing Bennerson v. Joseph, 583 F.2d 633, 641-42 (3rd Cir.
1978); Piper v. Hauck, 532 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1976); and Arthur
Murray, Inc. v. Oliver, 364 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1966)).

In Liptak,

certain tax payers had brought an action against the government for
wrongful levy, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the
government from selling their home in order to collect delinquent
taxes.

The District Court entered a temporary restraining order

preventing the sale of the home and referred the case to a special
master for a recommendation on the question of whether to grant a
preliminary injunction against the sale. The master held a hearing
and prepared a report of his recommendations.

The District Court

adopted the master's report and the Liptaks appealed.
On appeal, the Liptaks argued that the reference to the
special master was

improper

since there were no

conditions to warrant the appointment.

exceptional

They further alleged that

the master's report went beyond the scope of his charge in that the
master was charged to consider the issue of a preliminary injunction, but the master, going beyond the
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issue of

injunction,

recommended a dismissal of the Liptaks1 Complaint.

The Eighth

Circuit Court reviewed the exceptional conditions requirement as
set forth by the Supreme Court in La Buy, and found that

,f

[b]eyond

matters of account, difficult computation of damages, and unusual
discovery, 'it is difficult to conceive of a reference of a nonjury
case that will meet the rigid standards of the La Buy decision."1
Liptak v. United States, 748 F.2d at 1257 (quoting 9 C. Wright and
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2605, at 791 (1971)).
The Court then held that the District Court had abused its discretion in appointing a special master.
In the present case, consent of the parties was not solicited
or given for the appointment of a special master. Some exceptional
condition was therefore required. The special master was appointed
to review cost reimbursement requests.

Additionally, the master

took it upon himself to review the issue of attorney fees.

The

issue of cost reimbursements cannot be said to be a matter of
account, because the accounting was complete and the master was
simply charged with the responsibility of reviewing the accounting,
and presumably making recommendations as to the appropriateness of
the cost reimbursement requests. This purpose does not fit within
the narrow La Buy definition of exceptional conditions.
Just as matters of account are apt
to be most appropriate for reference,
conversely there are some matters that may
generally be inappropriate for reference.
Or stated differently, it will be rare when
some particular issues call for a reference
in light of the "exceptional condition"
requirement of Rule 53 (b) .
Thus some
appellate courts have expressed their
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disapproval of referring issues of costs
•

»

• •

5A Moore's at para. 53.05[2]

(citing Prudence-Bonds Corp. v.

Prudence Realization Corp.. 174 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949)).

Please

note that the Prudence-Bonds Corp. case, cited in Moore's for the
proposition that issues of costs are not appropriate for reference
to a special master, was decided before the La Buy decision which
restricted the use of special masters.

If reference of issues of

costs to a special master was inappropriate prior to La Buy, it
certainly would not be appropriate after La Buy.

It is even more

clear that the trial court did not have authority to refer to the
special master the question of attorney fees.
The conduct of the special master greatly exceeded both the
actual and the permissible scope of his charge.

The trial court

abused its discretion in failing to quash the appointment and to
strike all of the reports of the master.
B.

The Master Improperly Acted As An Advocate.

The role of a special master is quasi-judicial in nature.
A master has the "duties and obligations of a judicial officer,"
and is "an arm of the court."
53.05[2].

5A Moore's, at para's. 53.03 &

Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly

contemplates a judicial role.

The Rule gives to masters the

authority to hold hearings, take evidence, hear testimony, and rule
on the admissibility of evidence. These functions properly belong
to the judiciary. Since a master functions in a judicial capacity,
he necessarily

has the

obligation
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to

fairly

and

impartially

consider the evidence and make recommendations based thereon.

A

special master has quasi-judicial powers, and "because he is the
court's agent, he can and should perform his duties objectively."
Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1162-63 (5th Cir.), cert, denied,
460 U.S. 1042

(1982).

The job of advocating one position or

another is left to the lawyers.
The Master in the present case confused his proper role with
that of an advocate and adopted an adversarial posture.

The trial

court also apparently perceived the master's role as adversarial.
The only justification given by the trial court for reevaluating
the initial award of attorney fees was that the initial hearing was
not "adversarial."
The

only

(Memorandum Decision, October 31, 1989, p. 3.)

"adversarial"

element

to

the

subsequent

reduction,

however, was the Special Master.
Both the special master and the trial court complained that
"no worthy opposition" was raised to appellants' fee application
at the hearing on November 30, 1988.

Both the trial court and

special master apparently perceived the special master's role as
providing that opposition. That is contrary to fundamental notions
of due process, Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah 1982).
The initial premise was, in any event, incorrect.

If "no worthy

opposition" was raised to the fee application, it was not because
of a lack of an adversarial proceeding. Competent counsel appeared
at the November 30, 1988 hearing, and spoke against the appellant's
claim for attorney fees.

The hearing was adversarial.

clearly no basis to appoint a special master.
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There was

The trial court

abused its discretion in so doing.

The effect of the appointment

was clearly prejudicial, and the judgment of the trial court must
be reversed.
C.

The Proceedings Before The Special Master Violated

Notions Of Due Process Because The Master Failed To Hold Hearings
And Take Evidence On The Record.
In addition to having exceeded the scope of his charge, in
violation of Rule 53(c), the Master failed to hold hearings, take
evidence, hear witnesses, etc., as contemplated by Rule 53.

A

special master is called upon to perform a quasi-judicial function.
He is to recommend factual findings and, in some instances, legal
conclusions.

In order to do so, a master must follow proper

evidentiary procedures and comply with the requirements of due
process; therefore, for a master to take evidence on which to base
his findings and recommendations, hearings are required.

Rule 53

presumes that hearings will be a part of the normal course of
conduct of a special master.
(c)
Powers.
The order of reference
to the master . . . may fix the time and
place for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's
report.
Utah R. Civ. P. 53(c) (emphasis added).

Notice that the Rule

refers to "the hearings," not "any hearings," and therefore expects
that hearings will be held. Indeed, a master cannot perform a fact
finding function within the bounds of due process without open
hearings.
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Based

on this principle,

the Fifth

Circuit modified a

district court's order of reference because the order allowed the
special master to go beyond the bounds of Rule 53 and due process
requirements:
In one respect, the order of reference is too sweeping.
It permits the
special master to submit to the district
court "reports based upon his own observations and investigations in the absence of
a formal hearing before him." This not
only transcends the powers traditionally
given masters by courts of equity, but
denies the parties due process.
Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1162-63 (5th Cir.), cert, denied,
460 U.S. 1042 (1982) . The court went on to hold that the order of
reference should be modified to reflect that "unless based on
hearings conducted on the record after proper notice, the reports,
findings, and conclusions of the special master are not to be
accorded any presumption of correctness . . . ."

Id. at 1163.

In response to objections from appellants, the master did
condescend to hold one "hearing."

Appellants had indicated that

they would require at least two days to present evidence.
Statement para. 27.)

The master

(Agreed

instead, with the apparent

blessing of the court, limited the presentation to approximately
two hours on a Saturday morning.

Appellants were required to

present their evidence by way of proffer, rather than through live
witnesses.

Appellants attempted to comply with the master's

direction, and submitted testimony from several expert witnesses
based on a hypothetical question.
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In his report to the court, however, the master attempted to
discredit the proffered testimony, claiming that the hypothetical
question was incomplete.

It was clearly unfair for the master to

require the presentation of evidence by proffer, and to then
complain about the evidence thus presented in conformity with the
masterfs request.
POINT IV
ANY REMAND OF THIS CASE SHOULD BE
TO A DIFFERENT TRIAL JUDGE.
If any one thing is evident from the record, it is that the
relationship between the trial court and appellants was strained
and adversarial.

Appellants suggest that any remand of this case

must, in fairness, be with directions that the case be assigned to
a different trial judge.
An award of attorney fees is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
985, 988 (Utah 1988).

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d

It is difficult to conceive how the trial

judge can, with impartiality, exercise its discretion without being
influenced by a desire to vindicate the prior award.
Even where a formal motion for disqualification has been made
and denied, the appellate court still has authority to order that
the remand be made to a different trial judge.
Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 860 (10th Cir. 1976).

United States v.

The court in that case

stated:
This case has been before the same
trial judge twice. We do not challenge or
question the integrity of the judge.
However, under the totality of the facts
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and circumstances of this case, there is
a real likelihood that the same trial
judgefs impartiality might reasonably be
at issue under the terms of 28 U.S.C. §
455(a) which, as revised in 1974, disqualifies any judge from presiding in ".
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. "
We conclude that the demands of justice
require that the cause be retried before
another judge.
See also Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 596 F.2d 152, 157 (6th Cir.
1979) (matter remanded for rehearing before another judge even
though no party had moved for disqualification or suggested a
change of judge).
Canon 3(C)(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct similarly
requires that

M

[disqualification must be entered in a proceeding

by any judge whose impartiality might reasonably be questioned .
. . ."

The trial judge in this case has already twice tried the

attorney fee issue.

Under the totality of the facts and cir-

cumstances of this case, there is a "real likelihood" that the
trial judge's impartiality would be questioned.

In the event this

case is remanded, therefore, this Court should direct that the case
be assigned to a different trial judge.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's reduction in attorney fees made in the
October 31, 1989, Memorandum Decision should be vacated, and the
initial award made on December 6, 1988, reinstated.
Alternatively, the case should be remanded for a new hearing
on the issue of attorney fees and the case should therefore be
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reassigned to a different judge. This court should direct that on
remand the appellants be awarded a reasonable attorney fee based
on a percentage of the recovery, and based on the findings set
forth in the Memorandum Decision of December 5, 1988.
DATED this

s~

day of May, 1990.

tf^^f 7i7^</^V^/
ACKSON HOWARD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellants
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APPENDIX A
Memorandum Decision, datpd December 5, 1988

<r D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DOLLY PLUMB, SHEILA BOHARD,
RON C. BOHARD, STEVE RIGBY,
DEBBIE RIGBY, KENNETH CANDLAND,
B. CHANG, DAO VAN NGUYEN,
RANDALL HARDEN, PATTI HARDEN,
LEE FIET, GARY STRATTON, H. T.
ADAMS, ALBERT F. PERSCHON,
RALPH KNUDSON, DEAN HADFIELD,
ED WICKS, F. E. DRAPER,
ARTEMUS LITTLE, NAOMA LITTLE,
ANETTA J. BILGER, O'VERNON
CAHALL, and all others similarlysituated, WESTERN HERITAGE
THRIFT & LOAN, INTERLAKE THRIFT
& LOAN, COPPER STATE THRIFT &
LOAN, and CHARTER THRIFT & LOAN,
Utah Industrial Loan
Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, GEORGE
SUTTON, as Commissioner of
Financial Institutions for the
State of Utah, THE DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR
THE STATE OF UTAH, ELAINE B.
WEIS, ALPINE FIRST FINANCIAL,
ALTA THRIFT AND LOAN, AMERICA
INVESTMENT THRIFT, AVCO THRIFT,
BASIN LOANS, INC., CAPITOL
THRIFT & LOAN, CITICORP PERSONTO-PERSON, COMMERCE FINANCIAL,
COMMERCIAL CREDIT PLAN, INC.,
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, FIRST
THRIFT AND LOAN, GREAT WESTERN
THRIFT & LOAN, FIRST CHARTER
SAVINGS BANK (HERITAGE SAVINGS),
FOOTHILL THRIFT AND LOAN, HOME
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CREDIT THRIFT & LOAM, MODEL
FINANCE, INC., OVERLAND THRIFT
& LOAN, PEOPLE'S FIRST THRIFT,
PIONEER THRIFT, ST. GEORGE
THRIFT & LOAN, THE LOCKHART
COMPANY, U.S. THRIFT & LOAN,
UNITED THRIFT, UTAH FINANCIAL
THRIFT, VALLEY THRIFT AND LOAN,
WATKISS & CAMPBELL, INDUSTRIAL
LOAN GUARANTY CORPORATION,
RICHARD A. CHRISTFNSOH. JOHN H.
FIRMAGE, JR., ROBERT B.
BECKSTEAD, T. KAY LYMAN,
RICHARD A. VAN WINKLE, IRENE
JORGENSEN, STANLEY A. ANDERSON,
DEAN G. CHRISTEHSEN, ROBERT L.
LOWE, ED M. JAMISON, RUSSELL B.
JEX, CHARLES E. JOHNSON, RONALD
C. LEASE, M.D. BORTHICK, ED H.
THRONDSEN, RICHARD D. PAUL,
TERRY WARNER, W. HAROLD DOBSON,
RICHARD M. ROBINSON, PAUL A.
MILLER, CARL A. HULBERT, JOHN C.
JARMAN, FRED S. KOHLRUSS, LARRY
E. GRANT, LARRY HENDRICKS,
LARRY H. MILLER, and DOE 1
through DOE 300,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter was set for hearing on the 30th
day of November, 1988 on Motions for Final Court Approval of
Settlement and Final Court Approval of Attorney's Fees and Costs.
A representative of Arthur Anderson and Company indicated that
the ballots had been collated and tabulated as to the depositors'
responses in approval or disapproval of the settlement.
reported to the Court that only two of approximately 5,000

It was
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responding depositors determined to opt out of the class, thus
99.9% of the respondents accepted the settlement as negotiated.
The Court asked if anyone wished to be heard in opposition
to the settlement.

Attorney Robert McDonald, identifying himself

as counsel for the Association of Thrift Owners, stated that he
desired to be heard even though he acknowledged that no formal
objection

had

been

filed by

counsel.

Mr. McDonald

further

indicated that he had been retained less than 24 hours earlier to
proceed.

After hearing the argument of Mr. McDonald, the Court

denied his Motion, both as untimely and factually unfounded.
The

Court

additional

time

further
to

denied

provide

Mr.
the

McDonaldfs
Court

with

request

for

supplemental

information.
The Court then considered the issue of final approval of
attorney's fees and costs, and heard from the following persons:
Gay Taylor, Legislative General Counsel; Stephen Mecham of the
Governor's Office; Ray Christensen, counsel for the State; Greg
Sanders, associated with Carman Kipp, additional counsel for the
State; Shelia Bohard, with the D.O.I.T. Group, and Gary Stratton,
Chairman of the Board of the D.O.I.T. Group.
Finally, the Court heard argument from Malcolm Misuraca, one
of

the

attorneys

representing

the depositor

class.

At the

conclusion the Court asked if anyone else wished to be heard on
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the issues before the Court and received no further requests for
argument.
Based

upon

the

pleadings

on

file and

the arguments of

counsel, the Court makes the following findings in respect to
settlement and approval of costs and fees:
The agreement for settlement of the litigation is approved.
The Court finds the settlement to be appropriate and reasonable
on behalf of the depositors.

Those electing to opt out of the

settlement are granted their request, and are to participate in
no further way in the settlement.
As to the remainder of this decision regarding fees and
costs, the Court wishes to add parenthetically that the Court
recognizes

no

dissatisfied.

matter

what

the

resolution,

someone

will

be

The Court recognizes that to set a fee at less

than that requested by the plaintiffs1 counsel will be annoying
and unsatisfactory to counsel.

The Court is also aware that

setting any fee in excess of the legislative cap, or perhaps even
up to the legislative cap, at $1.5 million will run the risk of
creating in excess of 17,000 depositor ingrates.

Recognizing

that judges must make unpopular decisions, nevertheless the Court
feels that the decision herein is appropriate.
In making a finding as to fees, the Court is mindful first
of the agreement between the attorneys and the depositor group.
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The agreement calls for a fee, subject to judicial approval, of
not less than 20% nor greater than 40% of the recovery.

While

arguably the recovery amount may be $44 million, including $10
million from the State, $19 million from the insurance carrier,
and $15 million as a guarantee against liquidation funds, the
attorneys have requested their fee only in relation to the sum of
$10 million and $19 million, or from the combined total of $29
million.
The Court is further aware of Rule 1.5 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct which indicates that a reasonable fee should
be determined by consideration of the following matters:

(1) the

time

of the

and

labor

required, the novelty

and

difficulty

questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
services properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client,
that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude
other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged
in the
involved

locality
and

for similar

the results

legal

obtained;

services;

(4) the amount

(5) the time

limitations

imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the
experience, reputation

and

ability

performing the services; and
contingent.

of the

lawyer or lawyers

(8) whether the fee is fixed or
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the

above

criteria,

the

Court

finds:
(1)
12,000

That the attorneys have reasonably spent in excess of

hours,

concluded.

and

will

spend

more

time before

the matter

is

The novelty and difficulty of the issues involved has

required tremendous skill in dealing with these problems before
the legislature and before the court.
(2)

It

is

obvious

that

acceptance

of

this

employment

precluded other opportunities for employment.
(3)

The

fees

customarily

charged

this involve contingent arrangements.

for

employment

such as

This litigation could not

reasonably have otherwise been entertained, and the amount of 20%
to 40% of the recovery is appropriate in this and other similar
communities.
(4)

Considering

obtained,

it

the

is difficult

could have

expected

depositors

individually

maximum
should

amount
have

guarnteed

amounts

involved

for the Court to

a much more optimistic
did.

It

is

easily

and

the

find that

results
counsel

result, though the
arguable that the

of liability under any scenario that the State

incurred

amount

of

would

have been

an

amount

equal

to

the

$15,000.00 per account which was the ILGC

guarantee on such accounts.

Thus, anyone whose account exceeded

$15,000.00 could arguably have never expected a greater recovery.
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The time limitations imposed by the clients appear to

be fundamentally irrelevant, except as they may apply to item (2)
above.
(6)

The

nature

and

length

of the

relationship

does

not

raise issues that are remarkable, except to state that perhaps
the fact that the matter has been resolved in less than two years
and without the necessity of trial would argue for a reduction in
fees.
(7)

The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyers

is obvious and has been exemplary.
(8)

The contingent relationship has already been referred

to.
Having
that

a

considered

fee

at

each of the

the

of

the

20% of

contingent
the

total

agreement

in

reasonable.

The attorney's fees are thus awarded in the amount

$5,800,000.00.

amount

of

finds

relationship

of

the

minimum

foregoing, the Court

recovery

is

However, the Court finds that many matters

related to this case have not been concluded by counsel and thus
the

Court

will

reserve

10%

of

the

fee

until

counsel

have

faithfully completed all matters in the case.
The

depositors

further

asked

for

reimbursement

to

the

depositors group in the amount of $300,000.00; and, for a fund
reserving

the

amount

of

$650,000.00

to

pay

unpaid

costs

expenses; and an account for future costs and expenses to be

and

PLUMB V. STATE OF UTAH

PAGE EIGHT

MEMORANDUM DECISION

reserved in the amount of $1,000,000.00.

The Court specifically

finds as follows:
1.

The fund for future costs and expenses is not to be

reserved. The amount of $1,000,000.00 requested is denied and
that

amount

shall

be

included

in

the

depositors1

pool

for

distribution.
2.

The

reimbursement

for depositors

in the

amount of

$300,000.00 shall be reserved, subject to release on specific
application to the Court based upon specific documentation of
costs and fees and shall only be released upon Court approval.
3.

The unpaid costs and fees proportion shall be reserved,

subject to a similar accounting to the Court directly.

Since

these matters will require voluminous supportive documentation,
the Court hereby and herein appoints James U. Jensen, Esq., under
Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as a Special Master
for the purpose of reviewing the specific documentation giving
rise to the requested reimbursement costs.

Mr. Jensen is to make

specific recommendations to the Court as to his findings.

No

fees will be approved for reimbursement of costs or unpaid costs
and expenses until specifically recommended by the master and
approved by the Court.

Mr. Jensen and/or
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persons in his firm are hereby expressly

authorized to have

access to any and all documentation supporting such costs and
fees,

including

the

lobbyist's

fee

requests,

and

shall

be

provided such material upon request at the offices of D.O.I.T.,
Arthur

Anderson,

entity

or

necessary.

Research

individual

Associates

requesting

Compensation

to

Mr.

and/or

any

compensation
Jensen

shall

other

as
be

they

firm,
deem

carefully

reviewed by the Court and shall be paid from the funds reserved.
Dated this

<S~V>j

day of December, 1988,

/•s/
DAVID S . YOl/NG
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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the
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APPENDIX B
Order, dated December 6, 1988
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IITf CLERK
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DOLLY PLUMB, SHEILA BOHARD,
RON C. BOHARD, STEVE RIGBY,
DEBBIE RIGBY, KENNETH CANDLAND,
B. CHANG, DAO VAN NGUYEN,
RANDALL HARDEN, PATTI HARDEN,
LEE FIET, GARY STRATTON, H.T.
ADAMS, ALBERT F. PERSCHON,
RALPH KNUDSON, DEAN HADFIELD,
ED WICKS, F. E. DRAPER,
ARTEMUS LITTLE, NAOMA LITTLE,
ANETTA J. BILGER, O'VERNON
CAHALL, and all others similarly
Situated, WESTERN HERITAGE
THRIFT & LOAN, INTERLAKE THRIFT
& LOAN, COPPER STATE THRIFT &
LOAN, UTAH INDUSTRIAL LOAN
CORPORATION,
Plaintiffs,

v.
THE STATE OF UTAH, GEORGE
SUTTON, as Commissioner of
Financial Institutions for the
State Of Utah, THE DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR
THE STATE OF UTAH, ELAINE B.
WEIS, ALPINE FIRST FINANCIAL,
ALTA THRIFT AND LOAN, AMERICA
INVESTMENT THRIFT, AVCO THRIFT,
BASIN LOANS, INC., CAPITOL
THRIFT & LOAN, CITICORP PERSONTO-PERSON, COMMERCE FINANCIAL,
COMMERCIAL CREDIT PLAN, INC.,
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, FIRST
THRIFT AND LOAN, GREAT WESTERN
THRIFT AND LOAN, FIRST CHARTER
SAVINGS BANK (HERITAGE SAVINGS),
r
OOTHILL THRIFT AND LOAN, HOME
;REDIT THRIFT & LOAN, MODEL
r
INANCE, INC., OVERLAND THRIFT

ORDER

Civil No. C87-4879
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& LOAN, PEOPLE'S FIRST THRIFT,
PIONEER THRIFT, ST. GEORGE
THRIFT & LOAN, THE LOCKHART
COMPANY, U.S. THRIFT & LOAN,
UNITED THRIFT, UTAH FINANCIAL
THRIFT, VALLEY THRIFT AND LOAN,
WATKISS & CAMPBELL, INDUSTRIAL
LOAN GUARANTY CORPORATION,
RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON, JOHN H.
FIRMAGE, JR., ROBERT B.
BECKSTEAD, T. KAY LYMAN,
RICHARD A. VAN WINKLE, IRENE
JORGENSEN, STANLEY A. ANDERSON,
DEAN G. CHRISTENSEN, ROBERT L.
LOWE, ED M. JAMISON, RUSSELL B.
JEX, CHARLES E. JOHNSON, RONALD
C. LEASE, M.D. BORTHICK, ED H.
THRONDSEN, RICHARD D. PAUL,
TERRY WARNER, W. HAROLD DOBSON,
RICHARD M. ROBINSON, PAUL A.
MILLER, CARL A. HULBERT, JOHN C.
JARMAN, FRED S. KOHLRUSS, LARRY
E. GRANT, LARRY HENDRICKS,
LARRY H. MILLER, and DOE 1
through DOE 300,
Defendants.

Consistent with this Court's Memorandum Decision heretofore
issued on December 5, 1988,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the Agreement for Settlement of Litigation be

approved;
2.

That the two depositors requesting that they be allowed to

opt out of the depositor class be granted their request and therebyexcluded from the depositor class and the settlement;

2
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ORDER

That Malcolm A. Misuraca of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and

MacRae, formerly of Misuraca, Beyers, Costin, Case and Provencher;
George M. Haley and Robert L. Stolebarger of Haley & Stolebarger;
and Douglas B. Provencher of Beyers, Costin and Case, formerly of
Misuraca, Beyers, Costin, Case & Provencher, be awarded attorneys'
fees in the amount of $5,800,000.00, 90% or $5,220,000.00 of which
are to be paid immediately and 10% or $580,000.00 of which are to
be reserved until counsel has faithfully completed all matters in
the case.

The award of attorneys* fees is intended to reflect 20%

of the $29,000,000.00 portion of the settlement proceeds.

As the

$29,000,000.00 is reduced to take into account the two depositors
who opted out of the depositor class, the attorneys1 fees awarded
herein and the reserve of 10% shall also be reduced proportionately
to take into account these opt outs;
4.

That James U. Jensen, Esq. be appointed, pursuant to Rule

53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as a special master for
the purpose of reviewing requests for costs reimbursements, and
that services rendered as special master be compensated from the
funds hereinafter reserved, as approved by the Court;
5.

That $300,000.00 be reserved for reimbursement to

Iepositors, subject to release on specific application to the Court
)ased on specific documentation, as recommended by the special
master and approved by The Court;

3
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That $650,000.00 be reserved for payment of other costs

and fees, subject to release on specific application to the Court
based upon specific documentation, as recommended by the special
master and approved by the Court.
7.

That Arthur Andersen, a Court appointed Special Master

under prior order, be paid from the funds reserved under paragraphs
4 and 5, above. In the event the reserved funds are insufficient to
cover all claims for expenses authorized to be paid to Special
Master Arthur Andersen by Special Master James U. Jensen, Esq.,
then Special Master James U. Jensen, Esq. shall request this Court
to create an adequate reserve from the settlement proceeds to pay
the expenses of Special Master Arthur Andersen.
8.

That the "Notice of Objection to Disclosure Statement and

Confirmation of Settlement" filed by an organization calling itself
the "Association of Thrift Owners and Managers" be denied as
factually unfounded, in that the factual allegations made therein
are found to be untrue and not supported by competent evidence, and
the Motion to Supplement Record made in open Court by Robert
McDonald, appearing on behalf of said association, be denied as
untimely.

7\.

.

' " 6 , / ^
3Y THE COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the following,
this

_ \^p
U

day of December, 1988:

Malcolm A. Misuraca
Douglas B. Provencher
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
917 Colleae Avenue, 2nd Floor
P.O. box b78
Santa Rosa, CA 95402-0878

Gayle F. McKeachnie
Clark B. Allred
Attorneys for Stanley
Anderson & Basin Loans
363 E. Main
Vernal, UT 84078

George M. Haley
Robert L. Stolebarger
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
175 S. Main, Tenth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Roy G. Haslam
Attorney for Defendant
Throndsen
50 West 300 South #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Adam M. Duncan
Attorney for Defendants Lockhart
Co., Van Winkle and Dobson
800 Kennecott Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84133

Gordon L. Roberts
Barbara Polich
Attorneys for Defendant
Watkiss & Campbell
185 S. State, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

3ary Bendinger
3arol Clawson
attorneys for Defendant
Charles Johnson
L36 S. Main #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Roger D. Brown
170 S. Main, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

lenry Nygaard
attorney for Defendants
Beckstead
133 North 300 West
;alt Lake City, UT 84103

Thomas T. Billings
Attorney for Grant Thornton
50 S. Main, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84144

lay R. Christensen
ay E. Jensen
75 S. West Temple, Suite 510
alt Lake City, UT 84101

Carman E. Kipp
Gregory J. Sanders
175 East 400 South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Stephen J. Sorenson
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Attorney General's Office
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Robert M. McDonald
47 West 200 South #450
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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APPENDIX C
Memorandum Decision, dated October 31, 1989

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DOLLY PLUMB, et al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL NO. C-87-4879

vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al.,
Defendants.

The

above-entitled

matter came on for consideration by the

Court on the 17th day of July, 1989, with appearances as shown.
The

purpose

Final Order for

of

the

payment

arising

through

partial

settlement

hearing
of

all

was
costs

a common fund case.
of

this

to review and approve a

class

and

fees

from

money

The fund was created by a
action

litigation

which

settlement was previously approved by the Court•
The Court heard the oral arguments of
subsequently

reviewed

prepared transcript.
reports

submitted

in

detail

that

counselargument

The Court has reviewed the

The

Court

through

case

a

law

and

by the Special Master, and has reviewed

the

additional documentation submitted by the Special Master,

class

counsel and others.
The Court now being advised in the
its:

premises, renders

this
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Since this decision only relates to the payment of fees
costs,

a

full

history

and

of the case is not relevant. However,

some brief statement of the history of the

Orders

in

relation

to this aspect of the decision would be instructive.
On

December

Decision

5,

1988, this

to

review

fees

The

and

recommendation to the Court as
costs.

entered

a

Memorandum

through which the Court appointed James U. Jensen as a

special master of the Court*
charge

Court

order

costs,
to

gave

and

payment

Mr. Jensen

the

the charge to make a
of

such

fees

and

The Court specifically stated in that order:

No fees will be approved for reimbursement
of costs or unpaid costs and expenses until
specifically recommended by the master and
approved by the Court*
Mr.
Jensen
is
charged with the duty both to be fair to
those requesting payment, and to function as
a fiduciary for the purpose of preserving
the
maximum
estate
to
the
depositor
group.... (emphasis added)
In that decision the Court calculated
to

the

maximum

attorney's

fees,

amount to be awarded, based from a pool of $29

million and the Court reserved a 20% fee, or $5.8 million.
Court

analyzed

as

The

the criteria contained in Rule 1.5 of the Rules
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of Professional Conduct, and compared counsel's

performance

to

the standards therein stated.
At that time the Court did
situation

as

to

counsel

not

fees,

nor

counsel the input now provided from
Court

privately

expressed

have

a

did

the

truly

the Court have from

Special

Mr.

Misuraca

Master.

The

to class counsel, Mr. Misuraca, the

Court's concerns about the information provided
which

adversarial

in his

argument

took

by

counsel

to

exception, if not

umbrage.
The

Court

would

note that in no place did counsel for the

plaintiffs provide the Court with an adequate
cases

and

the

relevant

undersigned

have

appropriate

basis

had

law wherein

to

make

cases:
671

analysis

judges

similar

prior

decisions

as

for an award of attorney's fees.

was particularly concerned that
careful

analysis

it

was

not

of

the

to

the

to

an

This Court

provided

with

a

of the information contained in the following

In re: Wicat Securities Litigation, Civ. No.

83-1117G,

F.Supp. 726 (D. Utah 1987); Pennsylvania, et al v. Delaware

Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, et
S.Ct.

3078

So.2d 850

al.. No.

85-5, 107

(1987); or even of the case of Gamble v. Wells. 450
(Fla.

1984),

of

importance

as

to

the

issue

of

prepared

by

legislatively set fees.
On December 6, 1988, the Court signed an Order
the

plaintiffs'

attorneys

which

in

paragraph

3

authorized
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be

paid

immediately

to

the

plaintiffs'

attorneys.
Thereafter and prior to any such payment,
the

on

December

16,

Court entered an Order retaining 33%, or $1,914,000-00 from

the total

amount

of

$5*8

million.

The

Court

consistently

advised

the Court's Special Master that all fees and costs were

subject

to

continuing

review

due

to

the

fact

that

the

Court

felt

concern about the absence of an adequate adversarial

process in relation to

the

review

of

fees

and

costs

being

requested.
Based upon the more recent pleadings filed by the
for

attorneys

the plaintiffs and by their own retained counsel, it became

apparent to this
position

that

Court

they

that

the

attorneys

a

Minute

taking

the

did not wish to have the Master review the

propriety of their fees and costs.
issued

were

Entry

On July 5, 1989, this

specifically

requesting

the

Court

Special

Master lf. . .to inquire into all costs and fees, including
attorney's
added).
scope

fees and costs as presented to the Court." (Emphasis

The Court further said,
of

his

"If

Mr.

Jensen,

as

to

the

authority to examine payments or claims from the

depositors7 funds is to err, he
expanded

the

is

to

err

examination of the fees and costs."

made clear, it should

then

have

become

on

the

side

of

If not previously

abundantly

clear

tc

PLUMB V. STATE

counsel

PAGE FIVE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

that the Court remained continually concerned about the

focus on all fees and costs including attorney's fees that

were

being assessed.
The Court further on July 7, in an additional Minute
considering

the

scope

Entry,

of the hearing set for July 17, stated,

"Counsel are directed to address themselves to the substance

of

and

propriety of the requested fees and costs before the Master

and

before

the

Court

on

the

now

scheduled

and

pending

interviews and hearing dates."
On July 17, 1989, at the time
inquired

of

of

the

hearing,

the

Court

Mr. Misuraca not less than five different times to

focus his attention and his argument on ff. . . the
substance.

matters

of

. M as to why the plaintiffs7 attorneys should be

.

entitled to the fees they were then requesting.
During

the

whole

of

that

adequately addressed the basis
amount
whether

of

fees

the

and

His

or

Mr.

propriety

Misuraca
for

never

setting

the

costs to all claimants nor did he address

Master's

appropriate.

argument

recommendations

were

or

were

not

continued challenge was to the Court and the

Master as to their respective qualifications or judgment.
The

Court

through the direct efforts of the Master learned

that there existed substantial literature and decisional law
to

fee settings.

as

The cases showed that the Court could look, to

setting of "reasonable"

hourly

rates

for

services

rendered.
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(including hours
review

that

and

may
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rates

charged;

attorney's

review of the type of nours spent

have

been

duplicated

and/or

for

of "raw" time hours for their "hard" or "soft" quality);

and many other factors.
The

Court could further review the magnitude and complexity

of the

litigation;

the

quality

of

the

representation;

nature

of the attorneys' and other claimants' agreements as to

the representation (i.e., contingent or not); the risks
by

the

parties

and

the

assumed

counsel; the reaction of the class to the

settlement and fees; additionally the Court could look

to

some

of the factors of judicial economy in resolving the suit.
In addition to the substantive
determination

factors

giving

rise

to

of the reasonableness of the fee, the Court notes

with approval the language in the plurality majority opinion
the

United

States

Supreme

Court

dealing

said

of

in Pennsylvania v. Delaware

Valley Citizens' Council, cited above, at p. 3 086,
Court

a

wherein

the

it chose ". . .to 'err on the conservative side in

with

unnecessarily
other court.'"

any
to

fee
the

question'

rather

than

'contribute

overpricing of litigation in this or any
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As a result of the attitude of plaintiffs' counsel
apparent

claim,

that

they

misunderstood

the

Court's request of the Master, the Court

hereby

prior

fees

Orders

relating

to

attorney's

been

interim

orders

since

there

withdraws
as

was,

insufficient information and analysis

to

final

herein

decision.

Thus

the

Court

make

the

breadth of the

having

improvidently entered or in the alternative amends the
having

and

all
been

same

as

at that time,

an

makes

appropriate
its

final

decision.1
In

order

to

avoid further criticism of the Special Master

and the Court, the Court has conducted its own review and

Class counsel has criticized the Court and the Special
Master. However, it is noted that at a minimum, the Special
Master has brought to the Court's attention that even the
limited information available to the Court prior to entering
the previous Orders in this case regarding attorney's fees was
inaccurate and incomplete.
For example, class counsel had
cited a Third Circuit opinion in support of its assertion that
a multiplier of 4.0 of the hours expended was common. Not only
did the Special Master bring to the Court's attention that the
Third Circuit Court's decision had been reversed by the United
States Supreme Court, but the Master also pointed out that even
the Third Circuit opinion itself provided for a multiplier in
its case of only 2.0, and that was allowed only on a limited
portion of the hours claimed.
The 4.0 claim of the class
counsel was in error. The Special Master's review of the other
costs has also assisted this Court.
This assistance was
further confirmed by the recent adoption by the DOIT group of
the master's recommendation as to future cost accounting and
record keeping.
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evaluation of the materials presented, and

has

drawn

its

own

require

the

Memorandum Decision and Order.
Common fund cases such
Court's

as

this

case

always

determination of the reasonableness of the compensation

of those who participated in the creation of the fund.
common

a

fund is created by a judgment or settlement of the class

litigation,
determined

the
to

beneficiaries

be

members

to

of

class

are

Determining

obligation

of

the

There

be

no

anticipated

fund,

when

are

"class," are entitled to a

Expenses

directly

the

a

reasonable

attorney's

benefiting

fee

is

an

Court, and is anticipated by class counsel•
doubt

Court

in

this

case

that

class

counsel

would make such a determination.

counsel's agreement with the class representatives
this,

they

first paid from the fund under the direction of

the Court.

can

the

the

proportionate share of the fund.
the

When

Class

acknowledged

and Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires

it.
It

has

been

said

that

while failure is a bastard."
each

"success

Thus, it is

person

surprising

that

the

singular

contribution

of

and the merit of the full payment of that person's

claimed costs or fees.
the

not

person with any relationship to the creation of the common

fund would press upon the Court
that

has a thousand fathers,

In the instant case,

the

Court

sought

services of a Special Master to assist the Court in sorting
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The Special Master has called to the attention of the
a

considerable

body of law on the subject.

Utah federal

cases, substantially

all

such

outside

State

is

found

the

of

Utah,

opinions of other courts.
reports

and

legal

and

Relevant

publications

and

have

Except for certain
law

has

arisen

in the published

informative
also

studies,

been cited to the

Court.

Not unexpectedly, much of the law and studies

others

differ

from

Court

cited

by

the law and conclusions cited initially by

class counsel.
The

Court

has

now

reviewed

including the decision

of

Northern

California,

District

of

the

the

U.S.

law cited to the Court,

District

entitled

Securities Litigation, Civ. No. C83-4639
1989)

which

was

delivered

to

the

In

(N.D.

this

case.

Class

submitted

voluminous

requests.

The

documentation
persons.

and

The

counsel

and

documentation

Court's
discussed

the

other
in

Special

final

Cal., Oct.

3,

service
support

Master

same

full

with

record

providers
of

their

reviewed
the

such

interested

Special Master also visited the offices of DOIT,

The

Court

reports, and

supplemental

the

re Activision

the

and Research Associates, and conducted certain
hearings.

for

Court by class counsel on

October 11, 1989; the Court has also reviewed
in

Court

has

has

reviewed

received

documentation

and

the
and

conferences

Master's interim and

reviewed

information,

considerable

including

provided to the Court by class counsel at and before
on July 17, 1989.

and

a

that

hearing
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In order to
weighed

determine

several

factors.

limited to review of Rule
Conduct

a

promulgated

reasonable

Those
1.5

of

the

Utah

factors previously mentioned.

The

for

Settlement

Financing Act, and
Special

Master's

appendix thereto.
skills

Rules

Supreme
Court

the

Court

has

of

Professional

Court,

has

and

other

considered

the

of Litigation, the Thrift Settlement

the

additional

final

report,

matters
dated

suggested

in

the

July 14, 1989, and the

In particular, on the issue of evaluation

of

and competence of counsel, the Court finds based in part

on the hearing of July 17, 1989, and a
that

fee,

factors include, but are not

the

Agreement

by
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counsel's

court

performance

review

does

of

the

record,

not merit exceptional

recognition.
The

Court

suggests

that

class

counsel's

submitted to the Court were higher than
the

Court

hours.
this

has

noted

certain

reasonable

discrepancies

case,

the

Court

finds

that

the

2.0.

counsel,

and

hours,

most
4.0

applicable

hours

to

appropriate and
suggested

by

would approach a lodestar factor of 1.5 to

This lower lodestar also should be applied to the base

efficient

and

in such reported

To the extent a "lodestar" multiplier is

commonly used lodestar is far lower than the
class

reported hours

worked,

which

the

Court

of

finds based on the
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is

submitted by class counsel.

than

the

hours

A lodestar multiplier of

2.0 here, applied to all of the hours
counsel,

lower

now

submitted

by

class

and at the rate suggested by counsel, would produce an

attorney's fee of $3.6 million.
Based

upon

the

information

presented

Court also finds it appropriate to consider
the

total

common

to
the

the Court, the
percentage

fund to be used for class counsel fees when

determining a reasonable fee. A study of 206 common fund
action

cases

called

to

Memorandum
Research

involving

the
of

over

Court's
Points

Associates.

computing

$2.3

attention

billion
in

and

Authorities

The

average

the

in recoveries was
appendix

award

for

justify

an

even

to

those

both fees and costs combined was 13.2%.

could

class

the

submitted on behalf of

counsel bore little or no risk on costs so on
case

of

that

cases

In this case
basis

this

lower percentage applied to fees

only.
At

the

hearing on July 17, 1989, class counsel avoided the

Court's requests to give the Court
help

in

determining

a

substantive

reasonable

Special

Master.

advanced by class counsel
Court's

view

that

The
in

Court

such

to

fee, preferring rather to

employ his time in a rebuke of the Court and an
Court's

information

a

rejects

attack
the

direction.

on

the

arguments

It

is

the

Mr. Jensen was well-qualified to accept and
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discharge the Court's assignment as special master
with

diligence

and

competence.

the

His

so

service

class members has been of considerable value, and he is

commended by the Court for his manner, methods and
in

did

His strength of character in

fulfilling this difficult assignment is exemplary.
to

and

the

discharge

qualifications

were

of

his

challenged,

duties.
the

Since

Court

thoroughness
Mr.

notes

Jensen's
a

brief

footnote as to some of his achievements.2
The

ultimate

Court's,
views.
1.

and

determination

the

Court

must

in

this

assume

case

must

responsibility

be

the

for its

Thus, the Court awards fees as follows:
The

Court

calculates

class

counsel

fees based on a

combination of the above reasoning and awards class counsel a

Mr. Jensen holds J.D. and M.B.A. degrees from Columbia
University. He served as a law clerk to Judge David T. Lewis,
Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals and is
the former General Counsel and
Secretary
of
Dictaphone
Corporation in Rye, New York. Prior to working for Dictaphone,
he also served as in-house counsel for Ethyl Corporation and
Echlin Manufacturing Company. He has employed outside counsel
in literally hundreds of matters and has reviewed costs and
fees
therein.
He has been admitted to practice law in
Connecticut and Virginia as well as Utah, and is a third
generation Utah lawyer. In 1985, he served as chief financial
officer of Cericor, Inc., which, having sold its assets to
Hewlett-Packard, distributed over thirty million dollars to its
shareholders.
His several written reports in this matter
exceed 140 ' pages and demonstrate a thorough review of the law
and facts by a skilled lawyer/master addressing a difficult
matter.
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total amount of $4,250,000.00. The Court finds this

amount

to

providers

as

be a reasonable fee in the circumstances.3
2.
follows

The Court awards to each of the
and

adopts

the

service

recommendation of the Special Master,

except where otherwise stated:
Service Provider
Research Associates

Costs Awarded
4

$

375,000

Essig, Dansie & DeKay

107,240

Edgar, Dunn & Conover

65,810

Stroock & Stroock & Lavan

21,930

Economic and Planning Systems

24,990

DOIT Board

12,350

MBCCP (Misuraca)
Haley & Stolebarger

102,690
39,350

The Court notes that a detailed review of the actual
hours submitted and an evaluation of their respective weight
has not been thoroughly pursued because of the Court's belief
that such an analysis is only one of the many relevant factors
considered in arriving at the Court's finding of a reasonable
fee in this case. However, if further evaluation is required
in the future, this Court reserves for future consideration a
more detailed study of the time records of class counsel. The
Court finds that counsel has completed or will shortly have
completed all matters required of counsel in relation to the
partial settlement and thus the requirement of a hold back is
no longer needed.
The Court has reviewed all matters submitted by this
service provider and finds that the number of hours recorded
were excessive.
The figure found by the Court applies a
reduction in hours expended and yet reflects the value added by
this service provider.
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All amounts previously

providers

paid

to

counsel

such

herein
total

established,

payment.

and

are

to

providers

be

credited

all

service

shall be deemed to be a certification that additional

remuneration for such
provider

services

from

any

Arthur

will

member

counsel, or any third person.
master

service

Without waiver of appeal rights

which remain intact, acceptance of the payments by

service

and

are to be deemed an interim payment in advance of the

final Order as
against
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Andersen

Final

shall

not
of

be

the

sought

such

class, from class

payments
so

by

by

provide

the

by

special

restrictive

endorsement.
4.

The

Court

further

finds

that

since there have been

substantial delays in ultimately paying all fees
herein

ordered,

entitled

to

interest.

an

The

that

the

counsel

additional

and

cost

counsel

or

the

service

.akin

to

provider,

and

and

unpaid

second, adding an

amount generally equivalent to the average amount earned on
invested

common

fund

calculated

payments in full are made.

as

cost is to be calculated on the

basis of first determining the amount due and owing
to

costs

service providers are

administrative

administrative

and

the

from December 22, 1988 until

This determination is to be made

by

the Court's Special Master, Arthur Andersen.
5.
master

Consistent
Arthur

herewith,

Andersen

the

promptly

Court

requests

prepare

checks

that

its

and

make
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distribution of the remaining amounts due to class
the

service

providers

for

all

services

counsel

rendered

and

through

December 1, 1988.
6.

Special

Master

James

U.

Jensen

is

instructed

deliver a copy hereofto the interested parties and persons.
Dated this w / dav of October,^1239.

DAVID S. YOUN;
DISTRICT CO

to
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I
copy

delivered

a

true

and

correct

of the foregoing Memoranduia Decision, to the following,

this 31

dav of October, 1989:

James U. Jensen
Special Master
19 W. South Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

APPENDIX D
Agreed Statement in Lieu of Record on Appeal

JACKSON HOWARD (1548),
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752) and
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

S:haley-st.nn
Our File No. 19,397

Attorneys for Class Counsel
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DOLLY PLUMB, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
AGREED STATEMENT IN LIEU
OF RECORD ON APPEAL

vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al.,
Defendants.
MALCOLM A. MISURACA, HALEY &
STOLEBARGER, DOUGLAS B. PROVENCHER,
and BEYERS, COSTIN & CASE,

Case No. 900012

Appellants.

Appellants, Malcolm A. Misuraca, Haley & Stolebarger, Douglas B. Provencher, and
Buyers, Costin & Case (hereafter "Class Counsel"), by and through their attorney Jackson
Howard, and respondents, the plaintiff depositor class (hereinafter "Appellees"), by and
through their counsel on appeal, Craig G. Adamson and Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., stipulate and
agree to the following statement in lieu of a record on appeal. The parties further agree,
however, that the entire text of any document referred to herein shall be deemed a part of
the record on appeal.

1.

The Appellees in this action are the representative plaintiffs and the depositor

class consisting of approximately seven thousand households holding approximately seventeen
thousand accounts in five failed thrift institutions in the State of Utah. The Appellees seek
recovery of their lost deposit accounts. The Appellees have not had access to the funds in
their accounts since July 31, 1986.
2.

Subsequent to the failure of the thrift institutions, Appellees, through their

representatives, employed Class Counsel to represent them. This occurred after an extensive
search and interview involving a number of prospective attorneys. After negotiations between
Class Counsel's and Appellees' representatives, a written attorney fee agreement was reached
between Class Counsel and Appellees. The written attorney fee agreement provided, among
other things, that Class Counsel would be awarded a reasonable attorney fee to be determined
by the trial court and that the parties agreed that a reasonable fee would be between twenty
and forty percent of the recovery.
3.

Thereafter, one hundred percent of the class members responding (approxi-

mately eighty percent of the class polled) expressly consented to the employment of clas*
counsel.
4.

Class Counsel filed this action on behalf of Appellees on July 20, 1987.

5.

On October 24, 1988, Appellees filed their Motion for Certification of Cla<

Action which sought an order certifying the class for settlement purposes only. The motio
was stipulated to the principal defendants and was granted by orders entered October 31, 198
and November 2, 1988.
6.

In connection with their representation of Appellees, Class Counsel worked ar

negotiated with the legislature of the State of Utah, which initially resulted in tl
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appointment of a task force to study the claims against the State, and ultimately, after
numerous appearances by Class Counsel before the task force, the trial court, and after many
months of intense negotiations, resulted in a settlement of this case between the class, the State
of Utah, California Union Insurance Company (the State's insurer), and certain other parties
including the Trustees Loan Guarantee Corporation and thrift and loan institutions that
became federally insured.
7.

Legislation implementing the settlement was signed by Governor Norman

Bangerter on October 11, 1988, and is codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-21-1 to -10 (Supp.
1989).
8.

The settlement contained essentially the following terms and features:
a.

The State of Utah paid $10 million outright to the depositors from

the general fund.
b.

The State's insurance carrier, California Union Insurance Company

(MCal Union"), paid an additional $19 million cash to the settlement.
c.

The State advanced to the depositors an additional $15 million from

the general fund in exchange for a share in future receipts from the liquidation of the assets
of the five failed thrifts and the Industrial Loan Guarantee Corporation.
d.

The parties agreed that up to $1 million from the settlement could

be set aside by the trial court to create a sinking fund for expenses of the future class action
litigation.
e.

The State and California Union agreed to pool their claims against

other defendants with those of Appellees agreeing to share the first $5 million recovered, onehalf to the appellees and one-half to the state with recoveries over $5 million being distributed
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one-third to the Appellees, one-third to the State, and one-third to the insurance carriers, after
deducting costs of litigation other than attorney fees. Utah Code Ann. § 7-21-4 (Supp. 1989);
Motion for Preliminary and Final Approval of the Partial Settlement of Class Action;
Preliminary and Final Approval of Attorneys' Fees and Costs; Preliminary and Final Approval
of Amounts to Reimburse Depositors and Set-Aside Funds for Future Litigation, Costs and
Expenses (hereinafter "Motion for Preliminary Approval"), filed October 25, 1988.
9.

At a hearing held October 31, 1988, the trial court granted a Motion for

Preliminary Approval and approved a form of ballot. Formal orders approving the form of
ballot and exclusion (opt out) forms, and the form of published notice to the class, were
entered on October 31, 1988 and November 2, 1988.
10.

Documents outlining the proposed settlement were thereafter mailed to all

known depositors and published in various newspapers. Included in the materials thus mailed
and published was a notice that Class Counsel intended to request an attorney fee of $7.25
million (calculated as 25% of the $10 million portion of the recovery paid from the State
general fund plus the $19 million portion paid by the State's insurers).
11.

The class overwhelmingly voted to accept the settlement, which had beer

submitted to the class together with notice that Class Counsel was requesting a fee of $7.2'
million; 99.99% of the vote on the settlement was in favor of its acceptance.
12.

Only five depositors filed objections to the requested attorney fees, consistin

of a letter filed November 10, 1988, a Notice of Objection to Confirmation of Disclosur
Statement and Settlement filed November 21, 1988, a letter filed November 21, 1988, and tw
additional objections to attorneys' fees filed November 23, 1988.
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13.

A hearing on the proposed settlement and request for attorney fees was held

November 30, 1988. In connection with that hearing, Class Counsel submitted a Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Attorneys' Fees for Class Counsel. That memorandum discussed
the contingent fee contract, the Lodestar approach, the percentage of fund approach, and the
appropriate factors to be considered in determining fees. The memorandum included nearly
two hundred pages of addendum detailing time expended by counsel on the case.

Class

Counsel also submitted an affidavit of Senator Fred W. Finlinson, sponsor of the bill that
produced the settlement, who supported the fee request of Class Counsel. A separate affidavit
was submitted by Carman Kipp, counsel to the State of U'ah, in which Mr. Kipp stated that
the fee request of $7.25 million was not unreasonable. Ray R. Christiansen, co-counsel to State
of Utah stated his opinion that a fair fee would be in the range of 3.5 to 5 million dollars.
Counsel for the legislature Ms. Gaye Taylor argued in favor of a fee of 1.5 million. Malcom
A. Misuraca speaking for class counsel addressed the court in rebuttal and answered the
questions posed by the court. Mr. Gary Stratton, President of the depositors organization
(D.O.I.T.) reiterated that it was the depositors collective view that a fair fee would be 20% to
40% of the $29,000,000.00 portion of the recovery. Many other depositors were present but no
other depositor addressed the court.

The trial court took the matters under advisement

following the hearing.
14.

On December 5, 1988, the trial court issued its memorandum decision, and on

December 6, 1988, an order, which, among other things, approved the settlement, awarded Class
Counsel attorney fees of $5.8 million (20% of the $29 million portion of the recovery), and
appointed a special master, James U. Jensen "for the purpose of reviewing request for cost
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reimbursements . . . ." retaining those costs reimbursement requests made by expert witnesses,
lobbyists, and others under advisement.
15.

On December 16, 1988, the special master submitted his First Interim Report,

which was adopted by the trial court, without notice or hearing, by order entered the same
day. The December 16 order modified the trial court's December 6 order by withholding 33%
of the attorney fee award and concluding that a substantial portion of the costs and expenses
of litigation should be borne by Class Counsel.
16.

The special master's Second Interim Report, relating to the special master

Arthur Anderson & Company, was submitted in February, 1989.
17.

The Third Interim Report and Recommendation to Judge David S. Young by

Special Master, James U. Jensen ("Third Report") was submitted on May 2, 1989. The Third
Report recommended reduced cost reimbursements to all providers with the exception of
D.O.I.T. (a private corporation representing the depositors) and one private provider, whos<
requests were recommended to be reimbursed in full. The Third Report also recommendec
that the trial court's attorney fee award of $5.8 million be reduced by one-third (approxi
mately $1.9 million) to approximately $3.9 million.
18.

Prior to issuing the Third Report, Special Master Jensen held no hearings, an

took no evidence on the record. Special Master Jensen acknowledged in the Third Report an
in subsequent proceedings that his "investigation" and fact finding functions were conducte
entirely off the record and without notice to any parties.
19.

On February 14, 1989, the trial court entered an "Order of Dismissal ar

Order With Respect to Amended Pleading which dismissed all pending claims again
defendants subject to leave to file an amended complaint.
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20.

On March 2, 1989, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Create Reserve for Litigation

Expenses, which was granted by order entered June 8, 1989.
21.

On May 15, 1989, Jackson Howard, for Howard, Lewis & Petersen, entered an

appearance for Class Counsel with respect to the fee dispute, and filed a Motion to Fix Time
for Objection or Other Response to Master's Third Interim Report and Recommendation
together with a supporting memorandum. The-motion sought, among other things, an order
setting a schedule and deadline for conducting discovery with respect to the Third Report.
22.

On June 12, 1989, the trial court entered a minute entry denying Class

Counsel's request to fix a schedule for discovery and to respond to the Third Report, and
directing that no discovery be permitted. The minute entry further set a hearing for July 17,
1989, for review of the Third Report, and provided that all additional information relative
to the Third Report must first be submitted to Special Master Jensen and that Special Master
Jensen would schedule the presentation before the trial court.
23.

On June 14, 1989, Special Master Jensen sent a letter to Class Counsel and

other interested persons enclosing the minute entry by Judge Young dated June 12, 1989, and
giving directions for requesting time on the hearing scheduled for July 17, 1989.
24.

On June 15, 1989, Class Counsel filed their "Motion to Strike Reports of

Special Master and for Other Relief, together with a supporting memorandum.
25.

On July 3, 1989, Class Counsel filed a Motion for Stay, together with a

supporting memorandum, which sought an order staying all proceedings before the Special
Master until the challenges to his jurisdiction, authority, methods and "findings" could be
resolved. Class Counsel also filed a Request for Oral Argument in connection with the motion.
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26.

On July 5, 1989, the trial court sua sponte entered three minute entries. The

first purported to "clarify1* the direction and authority of Special Master Jensen. The second
minute entry denied Class Counsel's challenges to the appointment and authority of the special
master. The third minute entry denied motions by Craig Adamson, attorney for the depositors,
challenging the special master's reports.
27.

On July 8, 1989, and at the request of Class Counsel, a "hearing" was held

before Special Master Jensen. Class Counsel had requested approximately two days-to present
the necessary evidence on Class Counsel's request for attorney fees. Special Master Jensen
responded that only two hours would be permitted, but that testimony could be submitted by
proffer.

At the July 8 hearing, Class Counsel proffered evidence from several expert

witnesses, each of whom was competent to testify and was knowledgeable concerning class
action litigation and contingent fee litigation, and each of whom would have testified that the
$5.8 million fee requested by Class Counsel was less than a reasonable fee, or was the
minimum fee which would be reasonable.
28.

The hypothetical questions submitted to the expert witnesses accurately se

forth the relevant facts.
29.

On July 13, 1989, Jackson Howard filed a motion for continuance of th

scheduled hearing before Judge Young on July 13, asserting that Mr. Howard was the
involved in a previously scheduled jury trial in Federal Court which was running longer tha
expected and which would continue through July 17. Mr. Howard had advised Judge Your
of the conflict several days previously, but at the suggestion of the court the date remain<
unchanged pending developments within the federal case which might obviate the need f
changing the hearing date.
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30.

The trial court denied the motion for a continuance and instead engaged in

a telephone conversation with Judge David Sam of the United States District Court for the
District of Utah wherein Judge Sam agreed to allow Mr. Howard to leave the jury trial in
Judge Sam's court for the purpose of attending Judge Young's hearing. Judge Sam indicated
that he would not allow Mr. Howard to leave until 11:00, which meant that he would not be
able to arrive at Judge Young's court until approximately 11:30, but Judge Young refused to
alter the starting time of the hearing from the scheduled 10:00 a.m.
31.

On July 14, 1989, Special Master Jensen filed his Final Report on Costs and

Fees of Class Counsel and Service Providers to Judge David S. Young by Special Master James
U. Jensen (hereinafter "Final Report").

The Final Report, in essence, withdrew the

recommendations made in the Third Report, and instead "advised" the court as to the factors
which could properly be considered in fixing a reasonable attorney fee. The report did not
make any findings concerning the matters which had been proffered to the special master at
the hearing on July 8, nor make any findings on any other issues.
32.

On July 17, 1989, Judge David S. Young held a hearing in his courtroom

commencing at 10:00 a.m. Craig S. Adamson presented arguments on behalf of the depositors,
and stated that is was the position of the D.O.I.T. Board and the representative plaintiffs that
the December 5 and 6 award of attorney fees should not be reopened and reexamined. Mr.
Adamson further objected to the proceedings before the Master on the basis that the Master
had not provided for the taking of evidence on the record with an opportunity to the parties
to cross examine.
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33.

Judge Young stated at the July 17th hearing that he had received numerous

letters from depositors which were not part of the record and which he would not disclose to
counsel.
34.

Mr. Misuraca presented arguments at the July 17th hearing relating to the

qualifications, appointment and methods of the Master.
35.

Mr. Howard, attorney for Class Counsel, was not present at the beginning of

the July 17th hearing, and was not able to attend until after the hearing was more than half
way through, and therefore, heard only the last of Mr. Misuraca's argument. Further, it was
not intended by Mr. Howard that Mr. Misuraca argue the case, but because Mr. Howard had
not arrived when his portion of the argument occurred, Mr. Misuraca attempted to fill in until
Mr. Howard arrived. As a result, and because of extendea exchange between Mr. Misuraca and
the court Mr. Howard had approximately 15 minutes to address the issues before the courts
pre-announced recess time of 12 noon.
36.

Mr. Malcolm A. Misuraca also presented arguments, and proffered evidence

that Carman Kipp, if called to testify, would testify that the initial award of S5.8 million was
a reasonable award.
37.

Judge Young took the matter under advisement following the hearing.

38.

Following the hearing, Judge Young ordered a transcript of the argumen

presented at the July 17th hearing by Mr. Misuraca, but ordered no other portions. Th
portion of the transcript ordered by Judge Young was filed on August 22, 1989.
39.

On October 31, 1989, Judge Young entered his Memorandum Decision froi

which this appeal is taken.
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40.

Copy of the Memorandum Decision were mailed to all parties by the Special

Master, and a Certificate of Service was filed on November 6, 1989.
41.

On November 21, 1989, Class Counsel and the Plaintiff Class filed a Motion

to Disqualify Judge Young, which motion was heard by Judge Daniels on December 27, 1989,
and denied by Order entered on January 16, 1990.
42.

A transcript of the remaining portions of the July 17th hearing was prepared

at the request of plaintiffs and filed with the Court.
43.

A transcript of the hearing held before the Special Master on July 8, 1989, was

transcribed and may be considered as part of the record on appeal.
DATED this &*~ day of May, 1990.

'ACKSON HOWARD, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Class Counsel
DATED this

day of May, 1990.

STEWART M. HANSON, JR.
DATED this

day of May, 1990.

CRAIG W. ADAMSON
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APPENDIX E
Utah R. Civ. P. 53.

Rule 53- Masters.
(a) Appointment and compensation. Any or all of the issues in an action
may be referred by the court to a master upon the written consent of the
parties, or the court may appoint a master in an action, in accordance with the
provisions of Subdivision (b) of this rule. As used in these rules the word
"master" includes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner. The compensation
to be allowed to a master shall be fixed by the court, and shall be charged
upon such of the parties or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the action,
which is in the custody and control of the court as the court may direct. The
master shall not retain his report as security for his compensation; but when
the party ordered to pay the compensation allowed by the court does not pay it
after notice and within the time prescribed by the court, the master is entitled
to a writ of execution against the delinquent party.
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the
rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the
issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of
account, a reference shall, in the absence of the written consent of the parties,
be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master may specify or limit his
powers and may direct him to report only upon particular issues or to do or
perform particular acts or to receive and report evidence only and may fix the
time and place for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of the
master's report. Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the
order, the master has and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings
in every hearing before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary
or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the order. He may
require the production before him of evidence upon all matters embraced in
the reference, including the production of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon the admissibility of
evidence unless otherwise directed by the order of reference and has the authority to put witnesses on oath and may himself examine them and may call
the parties to the action and examine them upon oath. When a party so
requests, the master shall make a record of the evidence offered and excluded
in the same manner and subject to the same limitations as provided in the
Utah Rules of Evidence for a court sitting without a jury.
(d) Proceedings.
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the clerk shall forthwith furnish the master with a copy of the order of reference. Upon receipt thereof
unless the order of reference otherwise provides, the master shall forthwith set a time and place for the first meeting of the parties or their
attorneys to be held within 20 days after the date of the order of reference
and shall notify the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of the master
to proceed with all reasonable diligence. Either party, on notice to the
parties and master, may apply to the court for an order requiring the
master to speed the proceedings and to make his report. If a party fails to
appear at the time and place appointed, the master may proceed ex parte
or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a future day, giving notice
to the absent party of the adjournment.

(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure the attendance of witnesses
before the master by the issuance and service of subpoenas as provided in
Rule 45. If without adequate excuse a witness fails to appear or give
evidence, he may be punished as for a contempt and be subjected to the
consequences, penalties, and remedies provided in Rules 37 and 45.
(3) Statement of accounts. When matters of accounting are in issue
before the master, he may prescribe the form in which the accounts shall
be submitted and in any proper case may require or receive in evidence a
statement by a certified public accountant who is called as a witness.
Upon objection of a party to any of the items thus submitted or upon a
showing that the form of statement is insufficient, the master may require a different form of statement to be furnished, or the accounts or
specific items thereof to be proved by oral examination of the accounting
parties or upon written interrogatories or in such other manner as he
directs.
fe) Report.
(1) Contents and filing. The master shall prepare a report upon the
matters submitted to him by the order of reference and* if required to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he shall set them forth in the
report. He shall file the report with the clerk of the court and in an action
to be tried without a jury, unless otherwise directed by the order of reference, shall file with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the evidence
and the original exhibits. The clerk shall forthwith mail to all parties
notice of the filing.
(2) In non-jury actions. In an action to be tried without a jury the
court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.
Within 10 days after being served with notice of the filing of the report
any party may serve written objections thereto upon the other parties.
Application to the court for action upon the report and upon objections
thereto shall be by motion and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The
court after hearing may adopt the report or may modify it or may reject it
in whole or in part or may receive further evidence or may recommit it
with instructions.
(3) In jury actions. In an action to be tried by a jury the master shall
not be directed to report the evidence. His findings upon the issues submitted to him are admissible as evidence of the matters found and may be
read to the jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon any objections in
point of law which may be made to the report.
(4) Stipulation as to findings. The effect of a master's report is the
same whether or not the parties have consented to the reference; but,
when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final,
only questions of law arising upon the report shall thereafter be considered.
(5) Draft report Before filing his report a master may submit a draft
thereof to counsel for all parties for the purpose of receiving their suggestions.
(f) Objections to appointment of master. A party may object to the appointment of any person as a master on the same groimds as a party may
challenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial of a civil action.
Such objections must be heard and disposed of by the court in the same manner as a motion.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)

